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by
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I. INTRODUCTION
This paper seeks to provide some insights into properly framing the
contours of the fiduciary duties owed by those managing solvent
corporations operating in the vicinity of insolvency, there being, in a
majority of jurisdictions (according to the count of others), a well-known
shift of fiduciary duties to creditors on a corporation’s insolvency.1 The
decision spawning over a decade’s worth of scholarship on the subject is
the Delaware Chancery Court’s opinion in Credit Lyonnais Bank
Nederland v. Pathe Communications Corp.2 At the outset it should be
noted that the discussion in this paper examines a context at the interstices
of a number of areas of law. Normal state principles governing fraudulent
conveyances and transfers3 and federal bankruptcy law bear on the issue.4
*

Associate Professor, University of Missouri-Columbia School of Law; and
Senior Fellow, Contracting and Organizations Research Institute (CORI); J.D.,
University of Virginia; S.B. & S.M., Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The author
would like to thank Megan Pittman for research and editorial assistance.
1
Unsecured Creditors Comm. of Debtor STN Enters., Inc. v. Noyes (In re STN
Enters.), 779 F.2d 901, 904-05 (2d Cir. 1985) (“Thus, the ‘majority rule’ permits
recovery by creditors of an insolvent corporation for mismanagement as if the
corporation itself were plaintiff, while the ‘minority rule’ precludes suit by injured
creditors of an insolvent corporation, although a suit for misappropriation or diversion of
corporate property may stand on different and more solid footing.” (citations and footnote
omitted)). Assorted authority is collected in Royce de R. Barondes, Fiduciary Duties of
Officers and Directors of Distressed Corporations, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 45, at 63 n.54
(1998).
2
Civil Action No. 12150, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 215 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991).
3
UNIFORM FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT, __ U.L.A. __; UNIFORM
FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT, __ U.L.A. __.
The principles also may interact with each other. See generally Kittay v. Atlantic
Bank of New York, 316 B.R. 451 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“Allegations that an insolvent
corporation made a fraudulent transfer state a claim for breach of fiduciary duty.”).
4
A separate issue that arises in litigation is the extent to which actions of insiders
are charged to corporation subsequently in bankruptcy proceedings, depriving a trustee of
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In addition, other corporation law provisions, e.g., the limit on corporate
distributions to shareholders5 and principles regulating dispositions of
firms,6 may apply.
The law of fiduciary duties applied to distressed corporations should
be a comprehensive whole, consistent both internally and externally with
other principles such as federal and state laws governing debtor / creditor
relations. There is a wealth of authority, in case-law and academic
commentary, that is potentially pertinent. The purpose of this contribution
to the conference, Twilight in the Zone of Insolvency: Fiduciary Duty and
Creditors of Troubled Companies, is to assemble some of the components
of that whole, without undertaking the task (overwhelming for purposes of
making some observations for this conference) of (i) seeking describe the
full multi-field context of the academic discussion of the issues or (ii)
seeking to provide a comprehensive solution or (iii) seeking to catalogue

standing to assert claims against third party professionals. See generally Shearson
Lehman Hutton v. Wagoner, 944 F.2d 114, 120 (2d Cir. 1991); Smith v. Arthur Andersen
L.L.P., 175 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1199 (D. Ariz. 2001) (stating, inter alia, in connection with
not applying the Wagoner rule, “Where, as is alleged here, the Complaint alleges a farreaching scheme to continue a company in business past its point of insolvency and
systematic looting it, it cannot be said that such conduct benefitted the corporation.”);
(debtor-in-possession permitted to maintain claims against former Board of Directors for
breach of fiduciary duty, distinguishing Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. v. Bangor &
Aroostook Railroad Co., 417 U.S. 703 (1974), on the basis that the claims were being
asserted on behalf of unsecured creditors). This issue is the subject of other ongoing
work and is not discussed further in this paper.
5
E.g., ___ DEL. CODE ANN. tit. __, § __ (____); Model Business Corporation Act
§ ___ (____). Compare Carroll v. Valuation Research Corp. (In re Munford, Inc.), 97
F.3d 456, 460 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding state limit on corporate payment of dividends
and stock repurchases, GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-91 (1988), GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2154(a)(1), (2) (1982) (current version at ____), applied to consideration received by
stockholders of firm acquired in reverse triangular merger) and Wiebolt Stores, Inc. v.
Schottenstein, 94 B.R. 488, 494, 510-12 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (denying motion to dismiss
claim that distribution unlawful under Ill. Rev. Stat. Ch. 32, ¶¶ 8.65(a)(1), 9.10(c)(1)
(1983) (current version at ____) was effected by an LBO structured as a tender offer for
all the target’s stock in which substantially all the target’s assets were pledged to finance
the loan funding the tender offer) with C-T of Virginia, Inc. v. Barrett (In re C-T of
Virginia, Inc.), 958 F.2d 606, 614 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding amounts received by
stockholders of firm acquired in reverse triangular merger had not received distributions
subject to the limit on dividends provided by Virginia corporation law, Va. Code Ann. §
13.1-653(C) (Michie 1989) (current version at ____).
6
See infra Part __ (discussing fairness of conflict-of-interest transactions and
Revlon duties).
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the full range of variation among jurisdictions from Delaware corporation
law.
This introduction is being written in advance of the conference. Even
if not proposed at the conference itself, others discussing the subject may
assert that all of this should be relegated to express contract among the
parties, perhaps proposing that none of these duties should be imposed by
law and that, to the extent they are to exist, they should be expressly
created by contract. That appears to be a hyper-abstract approach to
analyzing efficiency, hyper-abstract meaning the analysis evidences a
level of economic abstraction that has, in abstraction, omitted pertinent
nuance, producing questionable conclusions. Two reasons immediately
come to mind.
The first reason is that this view focuses on the long term, without
adequately addressing the short-term and the intermediate-term
consequences. Many of the debtor / creditor relationships that present
these issues are long-term relationships. Their duration may be thirty
years or more, perhaps representing more than a generation in the case-law
development of the pertinent fiduciary duties. Simply relegating all this to
express contract does not address how the law should treat relationships
already formed under contracts that cannot practicably be renegotiated at
this time, e.g., long-term, publicly-traded debt. Appropriate resolution of
those cases is needed and should not be sacrificed for purposes of
developing a mechanism to address temporally distant disputes.
A second reason is that some of the subjects of these duties may be
difficult to negotiate. The debtor / creditor relationships that one would
assert should be simply governed by express contract would, one
supposes, be voluntary transactions, e.g., not debtor / creditor relationships
arising from tort claims. Some matters may be sufficiently sensitive that,
in the ordinary case, it taints the process of forming the mutual trust
required to enter into a business relationship to raise them.7 For example
7

Although not in the area of debtor / creditor law, Favrot v. Barnes, 332 So. 2d
873, 875 (La. Ct. App. 1976) (waiver of affirmative marital obligations), rev’d in part by
339 So. 2d 843 (La. 1976) (reversing as to “whether the earning capacity of an
unemployed, divorced wife bars her from alimony absent a compelling reason which
prevents her from accepting employment”), superceded by statute, __ La. Acts page no.
__, as recognized in Arrendell v. Arrendell, 390 So. 2d 927, 929 (La.App. 1980), raises
expressly negotiated issues that, one supposes, generally would not be the subject of an
express ex ante agreement, although there might be some general implicit expectations in
that regard.
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one of the fiduciary duties owed by those managing a corporation, at least
a Delaware corporation, is a duty of candor.8 Although my personal
recollection of practice is limited by both the fact that I engaged in private
transactional practice for only a limited amount of time and that the
experiences I had in practice are now somewhat shrouded in my memory
by the passage of time, I cannot recall a circumstance in which opposing
counsel expressly urged that his client should be permitted to make
affirmative misstatements to me or my client. A review of asset purchase
agreements in the Contracting and Organizations Research Institute
(CORI) database confirms that, at least in that sample of contracts, parties
do not negotiate contract provisions allowing one party to “lie.”9
It is, perhaps, common for parties to provide for a similar result by
negotiating contract provisions saying that one party has not relied on
certain information or that a warranty arising from any statement is
disclaimed.10 But that only serves to further the point. If it were not
difficult to discuss these issues, the matter—one party’s freedom to lie—
would be stated more directly, or at least stating it directly would occur
occasionally where the other formulations seem not to work consistently.11
A normal justification for the hypothetical bargain standard of contract
law12 is that it provides off-the-rack rules mimicking what the parties
8

See infra Part __.
A search of all the 866 asset purchase agreements currently in the database,
which is accessible, at www.cori.missouri.edu, for the words “lie,” “lied,” “lier,” and
“lies” disclosed only four agreements. Each used the word in some other way, e.g., as to
whether a subsequent lawsuit would “lie” in a particular a particular location. Asset
Purchase Agreement by and among SRS California Operations LLC, Noble Logistic
Services, Inc. (CA), Noble Logistic Services, Inc. (MI), and Noble International, Ltd. at
32 (March 24, 2003).
10
See generally, e.g., Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. v. Allegheny Energy, Inc., 382 F.
Supp. 2d 411, 416 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (construing contract stating, inter alia, “Except
for the representations and warranties contained in this Article III, neither the Sellers nor
any other Person make any express or implied representation or warranty on behalf of or
with respect to the Sellers, the Business or the Purchased Assets, and the Sellers hereby
disclaim any representation or warranty not contained in this Article III.”).
11
See Allegheny Energy, 382 F. Supp. 2d at 417 (noting that the effectiveness of
disclaimers of reliance on misrepresentations is influenced by whether the disclaimer
“tracks the substance of the alleged misrepresentation,” (quoting Banque Arabe et
Internationale D’Investissement v. Maryland National Bank, 57 F.3d 146, 155 (2d Cir.
1995)).
12
E.g., David Charny, Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of
Contract Interpretation, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1815, 1815-16 (1991) (“To interpret contracts,
lawyers ask: what would the parties have agreed to had they explicitly adverted to the
9
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would have bargained for without the associated cost.13 A separate
justification is that the process of reaching the bargain may alter the
relationship between the parties and perhaps prevent formation of
contracts that would be beneficial were the default rule properly selected.
Raising some issues in negotiation, such as whether one party is free to lie
as long as the lie is not made in anticipation of reliance,14 simply may
inhibit formation of mutual trust required necessary to form some
contracts.
It may be helpful to outline the remainder of the discussion and to
summarize the principal conclusions reached. The basic conclusions this
paper reaches are the following:
• The existence of an affirmatively enforceable duty under the
principles of Credit Lyonnais is not moot, because, inter alia, the
existence of aiding and abetting liability for breach of fiduciary
duty will give rise to a greater set of potentially liable defendants,
and increase the remedies otherwise available were the duties
contemplated by Credit Lyonnais not affirmatively enforceable
(aiding and abetting a fraudulent transfer typically not separately
giving rise to liability).
• The application of the business judgment rule to directors’
operations of distressed firms should be, if anything, stronger than
the corresponding provisions as applied to solvent firms, because a
contrary right would create an anomalous option for creditors
having expressly negotiated approval rights. Similarly, the current
trend finding charter provisions limiting liability to creditors or
trustees for breaches of fiduciary duties of care is desirable.

issue? That is, the interpreter constructs a ‘hypothetical bargain’: he determines how the
parties would have bargained to treat the situation that has arisen had it been directly
presented to them at the time they were forming the contract.”).
13
E.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 34 (1991) (“Why not abolish corporate law and let
people negotiate whatever contracts they please? The short but not entirely satisfactory
answer is that corporate law is a set of terms available off-the-rack so that participants in
corporate ventures can save the cost of contracting. Corporate law—and in particular the
fiduciary principle enforced by court—fills in the blanks and oversights with the terms
that people would have bargained for had they anticipated the problems and been able to
transact costlessly in advance.”).
14
Reliance is an element of the tort of misrepresentation. See infra note 118 and
accompanying text.
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The determination of the time horizon for which corporations are
managed should continue to be delegated to management,
notwithstanding distress.
During distress short of bankruptcy proceedings, fiduciary duties
to maximize firm value on a sale should continue to be owed to
stockholders. Approval of conflict-of-interest transactions by
disinterested stockholders should continue to shift the burden of
proof as to the fairness of the transaction.
During distress, the obligation of candor under Malone v. Brincat15
should appertain to communications with creditors, thereby
creating a duty not to make affirmative misstatements, regardless
of whether the communication is in connection with approval of a
particular action by the creditors. Financial creditors will consider
the information provided in connection with deciding whether to
exercise contractually negotiated control rights, and creditors
should be entitled to rely on truthfulness even if the debtor is not
aware of a particular action the creditor may take in reliance.
In disputes with a trustee or creditors, principles of implicit
ratification of an officer or director having taken a corporate
opportunity should be enhanced. The clearest case for allowing
creditors to bring an action for breach of corporate opportunity
obligations involve opportunities in which the director or officer
will be competing with the distressed debtor.

Before turning to the analysis, it is helpful to make one final remark
concerning the scope of this paper. This paper will not emphasize the
difference between those obligations that give rise to direct claims and
those that can be asserted only derivatively.
Litigation of the
corresponding duties to creditors frequently will be raised in bankruptcy,
so that procedural obstacles to pursuing these claims in solvent
corporations lose their force—a trustee may be bringing the claims if the
creditors cannot directly.16 This paper, for ease of exposition and because
the typical procedural obstacles will not apply in the context of litigation
of these issues in bankruptcy, may refer to stockholders as beneficiaries of
fiduciary duties in contexts where a claim for breach can only be brought
derivatively.17
15

722 A.2d 5 (Del. 1998).
See generally supra note 4.
17
See generally Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031
(Del. 2004) (restating the distinction between direct and derivative claims).
16
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II. THE ISSUE IS NOT MOOT
1. Different Scope of Persons Potentially Liable.
In Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland v. Pathe Communications Corp.,
the court stated:
At least where a corporation is operating in the vicinity of
insolvency, a board of directors is not merely the agent of the
residue risk bearers, but owes its duty to the corporate
enterprise . . . .
...
. . . In managing the business affairs of a solvent corporation in
the vicinity of insolvency, circumstances may arise when the right
(both the efficient and the fair) course to follow for the corporation
may diverge from the choice that the stockholders (or the creditors,
or the employees, or any single group interested in the corporation)
would make if given the opportunity to act.
. . . The issuer board or its executive committee had an
obligation to the community of interest that sustained the
corporation, to exercise judgment in an informed, good faith effort
to maximize the corporation's long-term wealth creating capacity.18
In that case, the “duty,” if it can be called that,19 to non-shareholder
constituencies was used in a defensive context, i.e., to defend the propriety
of action by those managing the corporation against a claim that an
improper constituency’s interests were being promoted.20 An initial
question is whether the contemplated duty gives rise to affirmatively
18
Civil Action No. 12150, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 215, *108-09 & n.55 (Del. Ch.
Dec. 30, 1991).
19
The uncertainty in terminology arises from ambiguity in whether there is a duty
affirmatively enforceable by creditors.
20
See 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 215 at *5, 106 (discussing a claim that a member of a
distressed firm’s executive committee breached a fiduciary duty owed a controlling
stockholder by delaying sales of firm assets). See generally Odyssey Partners, L.P. v.
Fleming Cos., 735 A.2d 386, 420 (Del. Ch. 1999) (“Moreover, in arguing that the
defendant directors’ failure to file for bankruptcy law protection was a violation of the
board's fiduciary duties to the stockholders, plaintiffs overlook that the board was
obligated to consider and protect interests other than those of the stockholders. When
bankruptcy and foreclosure are compared, and the effects of both on the shareholders,
creditors and other corporate constituencies balanced, the decision to proceed with the
foreclosure cannot be said to have been made in bad faith or a manner that was disloyal
to ABCO, taken as a whole.”).
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enforceable obligations, a matter that has been previously examined by
courts, which have expressed varying conclusions,21 and discussed by
commentators.22
A threshold question in assessing the significance of case-law finding
an enforceable duty owed to creditors of firms operating in the vicinity of
insolvency is whether it makes any difference at all. If the remedies this
theory makes available merely duplicate remedies available under other
principles, the matter merits little discussion, which would make for a
short conference program. By happy coincidence, the issue is not, in fact,
moot. One illustration23 involves aiding and abetting liability for breach
of fiduciary duty, which expands upon the liability regime otherwise
available in two ways. As developed below, the availability of a remedy
for breach of fiduciary duty adds potentially liable defendants who
21

See generally Weaver v. Kellogg, 216 B.R. 563, 580-84 (S.D. Tex. 1997)
(stating, in construing Texas and Delaware law, denying summary judgment on claims
asserting corporate opportunity doctrine violations in corporation allegedly in the vicinity
of insolvency); Kittay v. Flutie New York Corp. (In re Flutie New York Corp.), 310 B.R.
31, 57 (Banrk. S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“A court will find that breach of fiduciary duty is
properly alleged when the Debtor was insolvent or rendered insolvent by a fraudulent
transfer or was operating in the vicinity of insolvency at the time of or immediately after
the transfer.”); Production Resources Group, L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772,
790 n.57 (Del. Ch. 2004) (reviewing critically arguments that there should be an
affirmatively enforceable duty qualitatively different from that during solvency, stating,
“I doubt the wisdom of a judicial endeavor to second-guess good-faith director conduct in
the so-called zone.”).
Somewhat ironically, the court in Production Resources, in discussing the issue,
impugned, apparently as counterfactual, “extreme hypotheticals involving directors
putting cash in slot machines.” There is, however, authority involving this kind of
activity. Dwyer v. Jones (In re Tri-State Paving, Inc.), 32 B.R. 2 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1982)
involved officers who withdrew all the funds the debtor had in its bank account and
gambled it all in Las Vegas “to win enough money . . . to pay the corporate-debtor’s
creditors.” Id. at 3. The strategy was unsuccessful. See id. at 4-5. Of course, it is
unlikely that a reported case would involve managers who successfully adopted such a
strategy. Yet such a strategy may be beneficial for creditors. See Laura Lin, Shift of
Fiduciary Duty upon Corporate Insolvency: Proper Scope of Directors’ Duty to
Creditors, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1491 n.19 (1993) (reporting that the founder of
Federal Express successfully adopted such a strategy during a period of financial
difficulty).
22
E.g., Barondes, supra note 1, at 69-71.
23
There is no intent to provide an exhaustive catalogue of differences, which could
include different statutes of limitations, see generally Weaver v. Kellogg, 216 B.R. 563,
586 (S.D. Tex. 1997) (two-year statute of limitations for breach of fiduciary duty tolled
when “a corporation’s board is composed of alleged wrongdoers”).
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otherwise would not be liable and changes the nature of the remedy
available.
As a general matter, conspiracy to commit and aiding and abetting a
tort may give rise to liability.24 Where actionable, the elements for aiding
and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty are: “(1) the existence of a
fiduciary relationship, (2) a breach of the fiduciary’s duty and (3) a
knowing participation in that breach by the defendants who are not
fiduciaries.”25 Although historically there was some curious authority in
the Seventh Circuit,26 currently a number of jurisdictions hold that one
24

The following discussion of the distinction between conspiracy to commit a
tort and aiding and abetting a tort is provided in F.D.I.C. v. Romaniello, 1992 WL
369,557, at *1 (Conn. Super. Dec. 3, 1992):
In Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, the court traces the development of
the liability of a secondary defendant for the tortious conduct of a primary
wrongdoer. The court focuses on two variations of the theory of vicarious
liability, “... (1) conspiracy, or concerted action by agreement, and (2) aiding
and abetting, or concerted action by substantial assistance.” Id. at 477. It finds
that these “bases of liability correspond to the first two subsections in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 876 (1979)....” It quotes that section on
“Persons Acting in Concert” as follows:
For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another,
one is subject to liability if he
(a) does a tortious act in concert with the other or pursuant to a common
design with him ... or
(b) knows that the other’s conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives
substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct himself....
The first of these the court designates “conspiracy;”, the latter, “aidingabetting.” The court finds that “[T]he prime distinction between civil
conspiracies and aiding-abetting is that a conspiracy involves an agreement to
participate in a wrongful activity. Aiding-abetting focuses on whether a
defendant knowingly gave ‘substantial assistance’ to someone who performed
wrongful conduct, not on whether the defendant agreed to join the wrongful
conduct.” The court continues, “[T]here is a qualitative difference between
proving an agreement to participate in a tortious line of conduct, and proving
knowing action that substantially aids tortious conduct.” Id. at 478.
25
Weinberger v. Rio Grande Indus., Inc., 519 A.2d 116, 131 (Del. Ch. 1986).
Proof of damage is also required. Gilbert v. El Paso Co., 490 A.2d 1050, 1057 (Del. Ch.
1984).
26
The court in Koutsoubos v. Casanave, 816 F. Supp. 472, 475 (N.D. Ill. 1993),
stated, “Illinois has never recognized the tort of aiding and abetting a breach of a
fiduciary duty,” quoting a Seventh Circuit case stating, “There is no tort of aiding and
abetting under Illinois law or, so far as we know, the law of any other state,” Cenco, Inc.
v. Siedman & Siedman, 686 F.2d 449, 452 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.). Assorted
authority recognizing aiding and abetting predating Cenco includes, for example, Penn
Mart Realty Co. v. Becker, 298 A.2d 349, 351 (Del. Ch. 1972) (stating the test quoted
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may be liable for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty.27 On the
supra text accompanying note 25, other than the last four words thereof, and stating,
“The directors of a corporation stand in a fiduciary relationship to the corporation’s
shareholders. And one who knowingly joins with any fiduciary, including corporate
officials, in a breach of his obligation is liable to the beneficiaries of the trust
relationship.”) and Jackson v. Smith, 254 U.S. 586, 589 (1921) (firm’s receiver breached
fiduciary duty by agreeing to be a joint venturer in the purchase of firm assets in a
foreclosure sale, where the court stated, “[O]thers who knowingly join a fiduciary in such
an enterprise likewise become jointly and severally liable with him for such profits.”); see
generally Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Serv. Ctr., Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 485 (Ky. 1991)
(citing eight cases preceding 1970 in eight different court systems as authority for a
similar proposition)); and In re Aluminum Mills Corp., 132 B.R. 869, 892 (Bankr. N.D.
Ill. 1991) (noting, “Under Illinois law, a third party’s inducement of, or knowing
participation in, a breach of duty by an agent is a wrong against the principal that may
subject the third party to liability” (quoting Corroon & Black of Illinois, Inc. v. Magner,
494 N.E.2d 785, 790 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986)) and denying motion to dismiss claim against
lender who allegedly paid $100,000 to a company owned by one defendant to induce
defandant directors to breach their fiduciary duties to the debtor by releasing claims
against the lender). Modern authority construing the state of the law in Illinois includes
Shapo v. Engle, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17,966 at *60 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 10, 1999)
(“Although it seems that at one point Illinois did not recognize a tort of aiding and
abetting a breach of fiduciary duty, it appears that such a claim is now viable.”); Technic
Engineering, Ltd. v. Basic Envirotech, Inc., 53 F. Supp. 2d 1007, 1011, 1012 (N.D. Ill.
1999) (stating, in connection with claim a that officers of insolvent closely-held
corporation breached a fiduciary duty to a creditor and were assisted by a family member
who allegedly was not an officer, that Illinois law recognizes liability “for inducement or
participation in breach of fiduciary duty.”).
27
E.g., Smith v. Arthur Andersen L.L.P., 175 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1193, 1198-1201
(D. Ariz. 2001) (denying motion to dismiss claims against an accounting firm as
allegedly either a primary violator or an aider and abettor of a breach of fiduciary duty in,
inter alia, communications with the Securities and Exchange Commission); id. at 1206
(denying underwriter’s motion to dismiss claims alleging aiding and abetting a breach of
fiduciary); id. at 1208-09 (same as to outside general counsel); Adena, Inc. v. Cohn, 162
F. Supp. 2d 351, 357-38 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (denying outside counsel’s motion to dismiss
claims of aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty; controlling stockholder used
assets of closely held corporation for personal purposes, including payment of legal fees
owed defendant for matters not relating to that corporation); AmeriFirst Bank v. Bomar,
757 F. Supp. 1365, 1369 n.2, 1379-80 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (denying a motion to dismiss
claims against an individual the construction industry for allegedly aiding and abetting
the breach of fiduciary duties owed to a savings and loan and a subsidiary, stating, “[T]he
majority of case law, including that in Florida, recognizes a cause of action for aiding and
abetting common law torts, such as breach of fiduciary duty.”); Gilbert v. El Paso Co.,
490 A.2d 1050, 1057 (Del. Ch. 1984), aff’d, 575 A.2d 1131 (Del. 1990) (stating, in
discussing a tender offeror’s alleged aiding and abetting of a breach of fiduciary duty by
the target’s directors by virtue of the terms negotiated with the target that allegedly
preferred the directors individually, “It is well settled that a third party who knowingly
participates in the breach of a fiduciary’s duty becomes liable to the beneficiaries of the
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other hand, it appears that the current trend is to hold there is not separate
civil liability in comparable contexts against an aider and abettor of a
fraudulent conveyance28 (although, as discussed in the margin, aiding and
abetting qualitatively more egregious misconduct defrauding creditors has
resulted in criminal liability under other principles29 and participation in
managerial malfeasance that is a tort in addition to a breach of fiduciary
duty has resulted in third party liability under principles of civil
conspiracy30). This distinction is significant because the existence of
trust relationship.”); Weinberger v. Rio Grande Indus., Inc., 519 A.2d 116, 131 (Del. Ch.
1986) (granting motion to dismiss claims that acquirior in two-step acquisition by
omitting information about the target in a press release aided and abetted disclosurebased fiduciary duty breach by management of the target); Joel v. Weber, 602 N.Y.S.2d
383, 384 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (denying law firm’s motion to dismiss claims that it
aided and abetted a breach of fiduciary duty; breach involved diversion by entertainer’s
former management company of partnership distributions due the entertainer; funds used
to pay legal fees to the management company’s outside counsel (a defendant). See
generally Bancroft-Whitney Co. v. Glen, 411 P.2d 921, 936 (Cal. 1966) (unfair
competition claim in connection with corporate president’s breach of fiduciary duty
benefiting competitor). Compare Time Warner Entertainment Co., L.P. v. Six Flags
Over Georgia, LLC, 537 S.E.2d 397, 407 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (“Although this court has
never explicitly recognized a cause of action for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary
duty, we have at least twice implicitly acknowledged that such claims are viable. . . We
have explicitly ‘acknowledged an aiding and abetting cause of action in . . . fraudulent
conveyances.’ ” (citation omitted)) , cert. denied, _____ (Ga. Jan. 18, 2001), vacated, 122
S. Ct. 24 (2001), punitive damages award reaffirmed, 2002 WL 472306 (Ga. App. Mar.
29, 2002) with Munford v. Valuation Research Corp., 98 F.3d 604, 613 (11th Cir. 1996)
(“In this case, we decline to extend aider and abettor liability to breaches of fiduciary
duty concluding that Georgia courts would not recognize such a cause of action.”).
28
Baker O’Neal Holdings, Inc. v. Ernst & Young LLP, 2004 WL 771,230, at *14
(S.D. Ind. Mar. 24, 2004) (“[T]he Florida Supreme Court . . . recently joined the
multitude of other courts in holding that there is no accessory liability for fraudulent
transfers under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act.”); see also, e.g., Chepstow Ltd. v.
Hunt, 381 F.3d 1077, 1080; Freeman v. First Union Nat’l Bank, 865 So. 2d 1272, 1275
(Fla. 2004). But see, e.g., Munford v. Valuation Research Corp., 98 F.3d 604, 613 (11th
Cir. 1996) (stating one party “notes that Georgia courts have acknowledged an aiding and
abetting cause of action in torts involving violence, the sale of unregistered securities,
breaches of covenants with employment contracts, and fraudulent conveyances
29
E.g., U.S. v. Dolan, 120 F.3d 856 (8th Cir. 1997) (_________); U.S. v. Webster,
125 F.3d 1024 (7th Cir. 1997) (_________); U.S. v. Knoll, 16 F.3d 1313 (2d Cir. 1994);
U.S. v. Brown, 943 F.2d 1246 (10th Cir. 1991) (____________); U.S. v. Connery, 867
F.2d 929 (6th Cir. 1989) (________); U.S. v. Tashjian, 660 F.2d 829 (1st Cir. 1981)
(_______).
30
The actions that have been the objects of civil conspiracy, and that have given
rise to liability to co-conspirator professionals not arising from a breach of fiduciary duty,
have been qualitatively more egregious than the actions that might give rise to aiding and
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affirmatively enforceable fiduciary duties can materially increase the
potential liability of third party professionals such as accountants,
investment banks and lawyers.31 Indemnification is unlikely to mitigate
the potential liability materially, because this kind of claim would be most
typically brought against a professional upon the insolvency of the
client—the party who might naturally provide an indemnification.
A second distinction would be the type of remedy. An aider and
abettor of a breach of fiduciary duty is liable for compensatory damages.32
abetting for breach of fiduciary duty. Thus, lawyers knowing actions in seeking to hide
assets or engaging in sham transactions to prevent collection on a judgment have given
rise to civil liability. See, e.g., McElhanon v. Hing, 728 P.2d 256, 265 (Ariz. App. 1985)
(considering sham consideration for transfer of stock in lawsuit in which an attorney as a
defendant; one stockholder conveyed his interest to another after becoming aware of a
verdict against the conveying stockholder by a third stockholder), vacated in part on
other grounds, 728 P.2d 273 (Ariz. 1986). Other authority addresses claims by judgment
creditors or those whose pending claims have given rise to attempts to secrete assets.
E.g., Hadar Leasing International Co. v. D.H. Overmyer Telecasting Co. (In re Overmyer
Telecasting Co.), 53 B.R. 963, 981 (N.D. Ohio 1984) (affirming liability against lessor
for conspiracy involving backdating leases for purposes of limiting recovery of lessee’s
secured creditor); Dalton v. Meister, 239 N.W.2d 9 (Wis. 1976) (actions in anticipation of
trial designed to “liquidate and secrete” assets that could be realized-upon subsequent to
judgment). Aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty can create liability in less
egregious cases, i.e., circumstances where the complaining creditor is not a judgment
creditor or does not have a pending claim. A collection of pertinent authority is provided
in Milton Roberts, Annotation, Right of Creditor to Recover Damages for Conspiracy to
Defraud Him of Claim, 11 A.L.R.4TH 345 (1982 & Supp. 2005).
One of the more aggressive applications of civil conspiracy to bring a claim against a
third party professional is provided by Likover v. Sunflower Terrace II, Ltd., 696 S.W.2d
468 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985), where the court found there was sufficient evidence to support
a lawyer’s civil liability for having conspired to participate in wrongfully compelling the
payment of $400,000. The case involved a deed recorded by mistake; one party, with the
advice of counsel, postponed correcting the deed and sought to use the mistake as
bargaining power to settle breach of contract disputes for a favorable payment of
$400,000. Id. at 473. Although the attempt to coerce payment of $400,000 was
unsuccessful, the court found an adequate basis that the wrongful action harmed the
victim on account of consequential construction delays, id. at 474, and that there was an
adequate basis for punitive damages of $400,000. Id. at 475-76. See supra note 24 and
accompanying text (discussing civil conspiracy).
31
See generally Smith v. Arthur Andersen L.L.P., 175 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1193,
1198-1201 (D. Ariz. 2001) (accounting firm, underwriter and general counsel); Adena,
Inc. v. Cohn, 162 F. Supp. 2d 351, 357-38 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (outside counsel); Joel v.
Weber, 602 N.Y.S.2d 383, 384 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (outside counsel). See generally
Forum Ins. Co. v. Devere Ltd., 151 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1148 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (______).
32
Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Serv. Ctr., Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 486 (Ky. 1991)
(stating, in connnection with two third parties who formed a partnership to finance a
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A jurisdiction might also allow punitive damages.33 On the other hand,
liability for a fraudulent transfer typically results in a rescission of the
transaction in question. A recent Seventh Circuit opinion states:
[W]e are aware of no reported cases in which monetary
damages were awarded under the IUFTA, and courts such as
Robinson have held under their state version of the UFTA that
monetary damage awards are only appropriate where reconveyance
of the fraudulently transferred property is impossible or where the
subject property has depreciated in value. Policy considerations
would support such a rule, as it would avoid speculation as to the
value of conveyed assets.34
venture to be run by a corporate fiduciary allegedly in violation of proscriptions against
competing against one’s principal, “One who knowingly aids, abets, or joins a fiduciary
in a breach of his duty in order to make a profit becomes jointly liable with the fiduciary
for such profits. . . . It can be inferred that both [of two defendants’] . . . corporations are,
in a sense, their alter egos and are the instrumentalities through which these parties
profited, all to the detriment of the [victim corporation], and the benefits which accrued
to the individuals now take on the form of corporate assets.”); Whitney v. Citibank, N.A.,
782 F.2d 1106, 117-20 (2d Cir. 1986) (examining aiding and abetting liability of
commercial bank that, to obtain a deed in lieu of foreclosure from its debtor, a limited
partnership having a general partner as sole limited partner, paid $200,000 to two of three
partners for their consent; and affirming the award to the third partner of that $200,000
(less legal expenses) plus an additional $236,677 in compensatory damages, representing
a somewhat complex estimate, and $1.5 million in punitive damages).
33
Whitney v. Citibank, N.A., 782 F.2d 1106, 117-20 (2d Cir. 1986); Roth v.
Mims, 298 B.R. 272 (N.D. Tex. 2003) (noting compensatory damages including
consequential damages are available for breaches of a fiduciary duty, affirming award of
compensatory damages equal to the difference between an estimate of the debtor’s value
($2,049,000) and the value received ($275,000), and $1 million in punitive damages,
noting the bankruptcy court found, in a matter not part of the appeal, that the buyer of the
debtor’s assets was jointly and severally liable for the compensatory and punitive
damages under an aiding and abetting theory); cf. Holmes v. Lerner, 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 130
(Cal. App. 1999) (business consultant to general partnership found liable to other partner
for conspiracy and aiding and abetting fraud and breach of fiduciary duty; awarding
compensatory damanges for loss of partnership interest; jury also awarded punitive
damages); Time Warner Entertainment Co., L.P. v. Six Flags Over Georgia, LLC, 537
S.E.2d 397, 416 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (affirming an award of punitive damages against a
general partner (and persons controlling the general partner) of a limited partnership, for
breach of its fiduciary duty to limited partners in the management of the partnership, cert.
denied, _____ (Ga. Jan. 18, 2001), vacated, 122 S. Ct. 24 (2001) (as to ____), remanded
to 2002 WL 472,306 (Ga. App. Mar. 29, 2002) (____).
34
DFS Secured Healthcare Receivables Trust v. Caregivers Great Lakes, 384 F.3d
338 (7th Cir. 2004), certified question accepted by DFS Secured Health Care Receivables
Trust v. Caregivers Great Lakes, Inc., No. 94S00-0410-CQ-447, 2004 Ind. LEXIS 895, at
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The former remedy could be significantly larger.
2. The Different Scope Will Influence Market Outcomes.
Now that distinctions (who is potentially liable and the nature of the
remedy) have been identified, the question arises whether the distinctions
matter. A brief assessment discloses that the increased scope of liability
can influence incentives, which would alter market outcomes and
therefore be significant. Before confirming that the distinctions can make
a difference, it bears mentioning that it is easier to identify that the
distinctions can influence market outcomes than to assess whether the
increased scope of the potentially liable parties is desirable.
Consider whether creditors should be able to recover consequential
damages against an aider and abettor of a distressed corporation’s
transaction that did not promote the creditors’ interests. Allowing the
claim provides compensation for harm actually incurred. As an initial
matter (i.e., before considering market reaction to the legal rule), if
consequential damages cannot be recovered by creditors, some adverse
consequences of distressed corporations’ actions will be externalized. Of
course, the initial allocation of cost will affect market prices. If the costs
are allocated to creditors, creditors will charge more for extending credit.
*1 (Ind. Oct. 13, 2004) (identifying one of three certified questions as, “Is an award of
monetary damages under the IUFTA available only where reconveyance of the
fraudulently transferred property is impossible or where the subject property has
depreciated in value?”); accord Forum Ins. Co. v. Devere Ltd., 151 F. Supp. 2d 1145,
1148 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (stating, “UFTA allows only equitable remedies such as
avoidance, attachment, an injunction, or appointment of a receiver. Upon finding an
UFTA violation, the court may cancel the transfer or impose a lien against the transferred
property, but it may not award damages.”).
The Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act has a residual remedial provision allowing the
award of “any other relief the circumstances may require.” UNIFORM FRAUDULENT
TRANSFER ACT § 7(a)(3)(iii). Some authority construing this provision has been
described as allowing “compensatory” damages, albeit in the nature of tracing the
proceeds of property instead of consequential damages. See, e.g., Profeta v. Lombardo,
600 N.E.2d 360, 361-64 (Ohio App. 1991) (allowing recovery of compensatory damages
equal to the amount realized on a subsequent sale of property fraudulently transferred).
Other authority addresses the availability of monetary relief for purposes of assessing the
right to a jury trial on the issue, Hansard Const. Corp. v. Rite Aid of Florida, Inc., 783 So.
2d 307, 308-09 (Fla. App. 2001), or in other circumstances not referencing a right to
recover consequential damages. Morris v. Askeland Enterprises, Inc., 17 P.3d 830, 83133 (Colo. App. 2000) (holding punitive damages unavailable under the UFTA under a
principle that punitive damages are not available in equitable actions, in connection with
monetary award for fraudulent transfer of funds from corporation to sole shareholder).
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If the costs are instead allocated to professionals who advise distressed
corporations, those costs will be reflected in prices charged distressed
corporations by the professionals.
In either case, the costs will be reflected in what corporations are
charged, but that does not mean that they will have the same effect. Even
if the costs are passed on to the same aggregate extent, the costs will not
necessarily be ultimately imposed on debtor corporations in the same way.
There will be a variation in the impact on market prices if the parties on
whom the law may initially impose the costs vary in terms of their ability
to discriminate among their customers along two dimensions. The
discrimination can be (i) in the form of identifying those debtors likely to
create costs imposed externally and (ii) in the form of varying pricing
among customers. It would appear that third party professionals engaged
by distressed firms would necessarily be better at the former. An
investment bank assisting in recapitalizing a distressed firm necessarily
knows the firm is in distress. A creditor extending long-term credit, on the
other hand, may do so long in advance of the financial distress. Such a
creditor would have to spread at least some of the potential costs of
distress over many debtors (including some that would never become
insolvent).
By definition, a distressed firm would be in distress when deciding
whether it should engage in an action potentially governed by Credit
Lyonnais principles that creates external costs. On the other hand, costs
imposed on third party creditors who could allocate the expected value of
the costs in advance of distress would necessarily not influence debtors’
decision-making when in distress. That is because the fee charged a
distressed firm frequently would, at that point in time, be sunk (although
judiciously crafted covenants might nevertheless influence decisionmaking35). Relieving of liability parties necessary for distressed firms to
take acts that impose external costs of their actions will necessarily
produce more of those actions.
To be clear, this discussion does not conclude that liability should be
imposed on these third party professionals. The only conclusion stated
here is that it makes a difference whom the duty is imposed upon. One
can make a plausible argument that liability should not be imposed on the
third party professionals. The potential liability imposed on a third party
35

Cf. Barondes, supra note 1, at 51-59 (discussing covenants in financial
instruments and cross-defaults).
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professional found to have aided and abetted an action resulting in an
ultimate insolvency can be quite large. Imposition of this liability may
cause the best professionals to avoid doing business with distressed
firms.36 Large potential liabilities would create incentives for doing this
kind of work favoring professional firms that could externalize the cost of
a large judgment for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty (e.g.,
thinly capitalized firms). It is not clear that it is ultimately desirable to
create disincentives for large, highly sophisticated professional firms to
advise distressed firms. The distressed firms may ultimately get worse
advice. Of course, to reach a definitive conclusion, one would also need
to consider the extent to which all professionals could segregate potential
liability through, for example, incorporation of separate entities.
Thus, the principal purpose of the discussion in this subpart is limited.
It identifies one context in which whether the Credit Lyonnais duties are
affirmatively enforceable can alter the extent to which parties are granted
a right to a remedy, in a way that will influence market conduct. The issue
is therefore not moot.
III. ANALOGOUS ISSUES CREATED BY PREFERRED STOCK
As a final preliminary matter of background, it also should be noted
that issues of directors dealing with conflicting constituencies is not
unique to conflicts between creditors and stockholders in distressed
corporations. Although this paper is not the place to provide a
comprehensive recounting of how legal principles of corporate finance
have regulated conflicts between holders of preferred stock and common
stock, it bears mention that these conflicts have been litigated in a variety
of contexts. Three types of contexts of these disputes are identified below,
to provide a sense of how courts have gone about resolving conflicts
between holders of claims having conflicting interests.
The first illustration involves anti-dilution provisions. Well-drafted
anti-dilution provisions typically provide that, after an extraordinary event,
convertible stock will be convertible into whatever property the holder
would have received in the extraordinary event had the stock been
36

Cf. Royce de R. Barondes et al., Underwriters’ Counsel as Gatekeeper or
Turnstile: An Empirical Analysis of Law Firm Prestige and Performance in IPOs, at 26
(n.d.) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (asserting potential liability may be a
factor in a complex mechanism by which the level of law firm compensation is set,
accounting for a matching in reputation levels of clients and law firms).
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However, various
converted immediately before the event.37
circumstances may cause holders of preferred stock to seek protections
above those that have been bargained for by contract. Courts typically
hold that holders of preferred stock are limited to the express protection
provided by contract..38
The second illustration involves payment of dividends on preferred
stock. Preferred stock frequently provides that arrearages on dividends
prevent payment on junior stock, and that some level of continued
arrearages will allow the holders of the stock to elect a specified number
of directors.39 Baron v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp.40 involves a
challenge to a board’s failure to declare sufficient dividends on the
preferred stock to eliminate the separate right of the preferred stockholders
to elect a portion of the board. The court describes the test as follows:
“Before a court will interfere with the judgment of a board of directors in
refusing to declare dividends, fraud or gross abuse of discretion must be
shown. And this is true even if a fund does exist from which dividends
could legally be paid.”41 In this case as well, then, a court has in large
37

See, e.g., Wood v. Coastal States Gas Corp., 401 A.2d 932, 938-39 (Del. 1979);
Mariner LDC v. Stone Container Corp., 729 A.2d 267, 274 (Del. Ch. 1998);
38
See Mariner LDC v. Stone Container Corp., 729 A.2d 267, 274 (Del. Ch. 1998)
(stating, in construing anti-dilution rights, that the rights are principally contractual and
that preferences and limitations will not be implied), citing Elliott Associates, L.P. v.
Avatex Corp., 715 A.2d 843, 852-53 (Del. 1998); See generally HB Korenvaes
Investments, L.P. v. Marriott Corp., 1993 WL 257,422, at *14 (Del. Ch. July 1, 1993)
(concluding anti-dilution provisions prohibited dividend that would have resulted in a
negative conversion price); DAVID A. DREXLER ET AL., DELAWARE CORPORATION LAW &
PRACTICE § 15.13 (through December 2004; Release No. 17) (“[W]here the matter for
directorial action directly concerns the preferences or limitations affecting a class or
classes of preferred stock, the scope of the directors' obligation is contractual, and the
rights of preferred stockholders vis-a-vis the corporation will generally be measured
strictly by the terms of the charter provisions creating such preferences or limitations.”).
It bears mention, however, that in connection with allocation of consideration
between holders of preferred stock and holders of common stock, authority provides
fiduciary duties may cabin the discretion in allocation of the consideration between the
two constituencies. Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 509 A.2d 584, 594 (Del. Ch.
1986) (favorably commenting on plaintiff's allegation that holders of preferred stock are
entitled to a “fair” portion of merger consideration). See generally DREXLER ET AL.,
supra, § 15.13.
39
Exchange listing requirements may impose this kind of obligation. ________.
40
337 A.2d 653 (Del. Ch. 1975).
41
Id. at 659. Elsewhere in the opinion the delegation to management seems less
clear: “[T]he contractual right to elect a majority of the board continues until the
dividends can be made current in keeping with proper corporate management, but that it
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measure left the decision to management, few circumstances being
triggered by the fraud or gross abuse standard. Burton v. Exxon Corp.42
involves payment of dividends on a senior class of preferred stock, the
entire class of which was owned by the controlling shareholder, without
payment of dividends on a junior class.43 The court held the dividend
must be judged under the intrinsic fairness test.44 Applying the test, the
court concluded the test had been met,45 rejecting the argument that the
funds should have been retained and invested until the firm had sufficient
funds to pay dividends in arrears on all classes of preferred stock.46
A third illustration involves a corporation that changed its assets
through a combination of conveying some assets to a subsidiary whose
stock was spun-off and the acquisition from a controlling stockholder of
other assets, ultimately changing the nature of the issuer’s assets.47 In
dismissing the breach of fiduciary duty claim, the court stated, “When,
however, the corporate actions complained of are expressly contemplated
by a certificate, the duties and obligations of the corporation and its
preferred stockholders are governed exclusively by their contract.48
In sum, as a general rule, in these disputes between classes of
claimants having opposed interests, the courts have simply relegated
resolution of the matter to the parties themselves. That approach is
desirable. There is a lack of rigorous (meaning well-defined and
producing, as applied, a clear unique result) principle to guide an
alternative approach.

must terminate once a fund becomes clearly available to satisfy the arrearages and the
preference board refused to do so.” Id. at 658.
42
583 F. Supp. 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
43
Id. at 408, 411-12.
44
Id. at 416.
45
Id. at 416.
46
Id. at 419. The analysis includes an interesting turn of phrase: “It is true that
stockholders are owners of the corporation and expect to share in its profits. However,
these expectations can be crushed. . . . As investors, the stockholders bear the risk that
the company may not make profits in which they can share.” Id. at 418 (citation
omitted).
47
Winston v. Mandor, 710 A.2d 835 (Del. Ch. 1997).
48
Id. at 845 (also denying motion to dismiss claims alleging violation of antidilution provisions of preferred stock).
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IV. PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE SCOPE OF THE FIDUCIARY DUTY
Part II has identified a circumstance in which whether the principles of
Credit Lyonnais result in an affirmatively enforceable fiduciary will affect
the potential liabilities. That implies further review of the doctrine is
warranted.
Properly crafting fiduciary duties requires consideration of the extent
to which the duties will affect the performance of distressed corporations.
It is helpful as a preliminary matter to set forth a few principles that should
guide the analysis of the Credit Lyonnais duties. Three of these principles
are identified here: First, imposition of liability for failure to maximize
simultaneously the interests of two constituencies having different
interests is not defensible. Second, the governing principles should not
facilitate self-dealing. Third, legal rules should not force distressed firms
into insolvency by preventing activities necessary to allow ongoing
operations to continue pending resolution of distress, and should not
materially impede desirable actions necessary for distressed firms to
resolve financial distress.
In advance of reviewing these three principles, it is helpful to note that
there are multiple components to traditional fiduciary duties of directors,
i.e., the duties absent distress, concerning how the directors consider the
interests of the stockholders. The duties contemplated by Credit Lyonnais,
however, are sui generis. In part they necessarily are so, because they
form a transition between two regimes—management of the clearly
solvent firm and management of the insolvent firm—that involve
qualitatively different duties to the ultimate beneficiaries, the stockholders
and the creditors, respectively. For example, Delaware law has long
permitted disparate treatment of creditors by those managing an insolvent
corporation.49 On the other hand, disparate treatment of shares of the
49

Asmussen v. Quaker City Corp., 156 A. 180 (Del. Ch. 1931) (“[T]he weight of
authority favors the view that as among creditors, no trust exists which prevents the
directors of an insolvent corporation from preferring some over others, notwithstanding
the corporation is in failing circumstances and manifestly headed for disaster.”).
On a complementary level, exercise of creditors’ rights against a distressed debtor
by a creditor who is a majority stockholder may not be burdened by a fiduciary duty
flowing to the debtor. See Odyssey Partners, L.P. v. Fleming Cos., 735 A.2d 386, 388,
406 & n.18 (Del. Ch. 1999) (stating, as to actions by Fleming, the debtor's majority
stockholder and sole secured creditor, “Fleming is said to have breached its fiduciary
duties by exercising de facto control over ABCO and a majority of its directors, in such a
manner as to ‘frustrate or foil’ ABCO’s efforts to raise needed financing or capital, in
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same class ordinarily would not be permitted.50 Thus, in the transitional
area, there must be differential treatment of some of the duties that
normally appertain for the benefit of the pertinent constituency, the
stockholders or the creditors—some of the duties must disappear but
others simply shift.
These three principles do not have the same impact on all components
of directors’ customary fiduciary duties in solvent corporations. The
principles may highlight the desirability of restructuring some of the
fiduciary duties, but not others, when a corporation is in distress. Yet
because these fiduciary duties are sui generis, that variation in treatment is
not inherently inappropriate.
1. Multiple Principals.
It has long been recognized that a fiduciary cannot simultaneously
promote the interests of principals having varying interests.51 There is not
an obvious reason why liability should be imposed on a class of business
participants for failing to perform this impossible task. This provides a
justification for the outcomes discussed in Part __, where in contexts
where the parties have negotiated contract provisions addressing
extraordinary transactions, courts largely relegate to boards decisionmaking that involves “pie-splitting” between preferred stockholders and
common stockholders.52 It would appear to be sufficiently uncontroversial
so that additional explanation is unnecessary.
Reference to preferred stock also raises a second issue that further
complicates a determination of the proper principles: Even if one includes
as constituents only stockholders and creditors as creditors, resolution of
order to protect Fleming's position as controlling shareholder,” and, “Rather, Fleming
acquired the shares by operation of law, as the high bidder at the statutory foreclosure
sale. In the circumstances, there is no precedent for applying a fiduciary duty analysis to
the conduct of the January 9, 1996 foreclosure sale or the terms of Fleming’s winning
bid.”).
50
______.
51
E.g., Gann v. Zettler, 60 S.E. 283, 283 (Ga. Ct. App. 1908) (“It is recorded of
Him ‘who spake as never man spoke’ that, ‘seeing the multitudes, he went up into a
mountain, and when he was set his disciples came unto him; and he opened his mouth
and taught them; saying: * * * “No man can serve two masters; for either he will hate the
one and love the other, or else he will hold to the one and despise the other.” ’ So, also,
is our law.”).
52
But see Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 509 A.2d 584, 594 (Del. Ch. 1986)
(favorably commenting on plaintiff's allegation that holders of preferred stock are entitled
to a “fair” portion of merger consideration).
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the issues raised by Credit Lyonnais can involve resolution of competing
claims among multiple constituencies. If the point is to have a
corporation’s directors promote the interests of the then-current residual
claimants, preferred stockholders may be appropriate constituents.
Preferred stock frequently will have a liquidation preference.53 Where the
corporation’s net assets are positive but less than that aggregate liquidation
preference, preferred stockholders are the residual claimants.
Of course, a corporation may have multiple classes of preferred stock,
having varying relative liquidation preferences. Subordinated debt
presents similar issues. Where a corporation has negative net assets but
can pay senior claims, the subordinated creditors are residual claimants.54
In sum, there may be a succession of classes of residual claimants as a
corporation becomes increasingly distressed. The existence of numerous
tranches of potential residual claimants would militate against some
affirmatively enforceable duty shifting among constituents of distressed
corporations.55 In those cases, as the number of tranches increases, the
burden on management to select the proper constituency increases. As

53

___________.
Of course, when insolvency straddles the amount of debt subordinated, there can
be the awkward circumstance of multiple classes of residual claimants who are not pari
passu (e.g., trade creditors to whom the subordinated creditors were not subordinated).
The trade creditors will not be effectively pari passu with subordinated creditor, who
abruptly become residual claimants when the ratio of the assets of the firm to its
liabilities (a ratio less than firms that are insolvent on a balance sheet basis) equals the
ratio of the senior debt to the sum of the senior and subordinated debt (as derived below).
Trade creditors also will not be pari passu with senior creditors whose percentage
residual claim changes abruptly in that circumstance as well.
The derivation of the first proposition is as follows:
Define
as the ratio of the firm’s assets to its liabilities, implying that
=α
. Senior creditors will recover the following, up to the amount of their
senior claims:
54

α

+
+

+

For senior creditors to recover in full, the above amount equals senior debt, which
occurs when α =
55

+

See generally Equity-Linked Investors, L.P. V. Adams, 705 A.2d 1040 (Del. Ch.
1997) (denying holders of preferred stock equitable relief seeking to enjoin a transaction
to fund further operations where the corporation had a net worth less than the aggregate
liquidation preference of the preferred stock.
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discussed below,56 for some types of fiduciary duties, however, this
problem is more manageable than others.
2. Facilitating Self-Dealing.
A fundamental precept of developed analysis of business organization
law is the separation of ownership from control creates incentives for
suboptimal behavior.57 The problem is particularly acute because the
judicial system is not well-crafted to identify some of this suboptimal
behavior. An examination of the development of the Credit Lyonnais
duties should consider the extent to which the principles produce legal
rules that make it more difficult for undesirable self-dealing to be
identified, and give rise to liability, in judicial proceedings.
3. Operation of Distressed Firms and Resolution of Distress.
One focus of the principles governing management of a distressed firm
should be maximization of aggregate distressed firm value. That is not to
say distributional concerns—how the principles will influence allocation
of value among different classes of claimants—are necessarily irrelevant.
However, one focus should be whether developing legal principles will
impede actions that are collectively desirable.
In particular, the
developing notions of duties in distressed corporations need to be
examined from the perspective of whether they will materially impede the
ongoing, i.e., ordinary course, operation of distressed corporations58 and
whether they will inhibit the formulation, adoption or implementation of
desirable attempts to resolve the distress outside the ordinary course.
The existence of affirmatively enforceable fiduciary duties to trade
creditors and, perhaps, some other creditors including employees, raises
issues that are qualitatively different from the implications of duties owed
to shareholders. Continuing operation of a distressed corporation typically
will include ongoing contracting with current creditors, such as the
purchase of additional inventory and services on trade credit and revision
56

See infra note __ and accompanying text.
See ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 6 (1932) (“The separation of ownership from control produces a
condition where the interests of owner and of ultimate manager may, and often do,
diverge, and where many of the checks which formerly operated to limit the use of power
disappear.”).
58
See generally Production Resources Group, L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc., 863
A.2d 772, 797 (Del. Ch. 2004) (discussing possible fraud liability for omissions in
negotiations with creditors).
57
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of existing employment relationships. A corporation’s relationships with
its shareholders certainly can involve post-relationship contracting, e.g.,
stock buybacks, and frequently does in connection with stock-buybacks
triggered by termination of employment.59 Nevertheless, the scope of the
interactions between a distressed corporation and its creditors can be
expected to be qualitatively different in frequency from the transactions
between a corporation and its shareholders. This qualitative difference
creates possible concerns with importing into the regulation of distressed
corporations, for the benefit of creditors, certain components of the
fiduciary duties that ordinarily apply to solvent corporations. Two that
may have a particularly significant impact on the ability of a distressed
corporation to continue operations or to resolve its distress are discussed
below: a fiduciary’s disclosure obligations in transactions with the
beneficiary of the fiduciary duty60 and a fiduciary’s obligation to assure
fair pricing in those transactions.61
V. IMPROPERLY FRAMING THE ISSUE AS MERELY A QUESTION OF
EXPANDING THE SCOPE OF ACTIVITIES PROTECTED FROM JUDICIAL REVIEW
BY THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE
One might argue that the duty initially formulated in Credit Lyonnais
simply represents an increase in the scope of directors’ (and potentially
officers’62) activity that, by virtue of the business judgment rule, is not
subject to judicial review. In this view, the principle has a number of
components. First, it exculpates directors from liability to creditors for
disinterested management decisions, supplementing the limit on liability
to the corporation generally applicable when the corporation is solvent.
Second, it further restricts the ability of a court to entertain challenges to
some managerial decisions in distressed corporations.
A problem with this view is that the law of fiduciary duties applied to
distressed corporations should be a comprehensive, internally consistent
59

See infra Part __.
See infra Part __.
61
See infra Part __.
62
There appears to be curiously little authority directly addressing the extent to
which officers benefit from the business judgment rule. For example, in the preeminent
treatise on the business judgment rule, DENNIS J. BLOCK ET AL., THE BUSINESS
JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS (____ ed. ____ &
Supp. ___), identifies only ____ cases addressing the issue, with ___ ruling officers
benefit and ___ holding ____. A discussion of the merits of the various positions is
beyond the scope of this paper.
60
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whole (the purpose of this paper being to develop some of the components
of that whole). The articulation of the issue that Credit Lyonnais identifies
also brings to mind other contexts in which the fiduciary duties of
distressed firms need to be examined. Four of those contexts are
discussed below:
(i) which constituency of a distressed corporation may, by
approving a transaction in which management is interested, diminish
the judicial scrutiny that would otherwise apply;
(ii) the impact of distress on Revlon duties;
(iii) the impact of distress on the disclosure obligations of
distressed corporations to, and other aspects of the negotiation between
distressed corporations and, their creditors, including the implications
of Malone v. Brincat;63 and
(iv) the impact of distress on the manner in which corporations
consider corporate opportunities that insiders are interested in taking
for themselves.
1. Traditional Formulation of the Business Judgment Rule.
In discussing whether the refinement in directors’ duties initiated by
Credit Lyonnais can be viewed as simply a slight enlargement of the
business judgment rule, it is helpful to begin by identifying that rule and
the principles underlying its adoption. The fiduciary duties of directors, as
cabined by the business judgment rule, are best viewed as reflecting the
scope of judicial competence. Lawyers acting in a judicial capacity are
not well-suited to reviewing previously made business decisions. Courts
are, however, competent to assess the propriety of how the decisionmaking process was constructed—whether appropriate information was
gathered, whether appropriate experts were consulted and whether there
were conflicts of interest that could have affected the outcome.
Recognition of this limit on judicial competence is reflected in the
business judgment rule,64 a principle which has been described as follows:
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722 A.2d 5 (Del. 1998).
Alaska Plastics, Inc. v. Coopock, 621 P.2d 270, 278 (Alaska 1980), quoting
Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (“[J]udges are not business
experts.”); Janssen v. Best & Flanagan, 662 N.W.2d 876, 883 (Minn. 2003) (referencing
the rationale in extending the business judgment rule to nonprofit corporations); see
Daniels v. Thomas, Dean & Hoskins, Inc., 804 P.2d 359, 367 (Mont. 1990).
64
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The business judgment rule has been well formulated by Aronson
and other cases. See, e.g., Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812 (“It is a
presumption that in making a business decision the directors ...
acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief
that the action taken was in the best interests of the corporation.”).
Thus, directors’ decisions will be respected by courts unless the
directors are interested or lack independence relative to the
decision, do not act in good faith, act in a manner that cannot be
attributed to a rational business purpose or reach their decision by
a grossly negligent process that includes the failure to consider all
material facts reasonably available.65
2. Fairness Review in Distressed Firms; Earn-Outs
De Facto Elimination of Fairness Review in Distressed Firms. Of
course, the business judgment rule does not, as an initial matter, insulate
decision-making involving conflicts of interest. Under Weinberger v.
UOP, Inc.66 and its progeny, “[a] controlling or dominating shareholder
standing on both sides of a transaction, as in a parent-subsidiary context,
bears the burden of proving its entire fairness.”67 Procedurally,
[t]he initial burden of establishing entire fairness rests upon the
party who stands on both sides of the transaction. However, an
approval of the transaction by an independent committee of
directors or an informed majority of minority shareholders shifts
the burden of proof on the issue of fairness from the controlling or
dominating shareholder to the challenging shareholder-plaintiff.68
Alternatively, some Delaware authority indicates that where the
disposition involves an interested party transaction with one not
considered to control the corporation, informed approval in good faith by a
65

Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 n.66 (Del. 2000).
457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
67
Kahn v. Lynch Communication Systems, Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1115 (Del. 1994).
However, where an acquisition is formulated as a tender offer followed by a short-form
squeeze-out merger, the transaction is subject to a less intrusive standard of review. See
generally Glassman v. Unocal Exploration Corp., 777 A.2d 242, 243 (Del. 2001);
Solomon v. Pathe Communications Corp., 672 A.2d 35, 39 (Del. 1996), In re. Pure Res.,
Inc., S’holders Litig, 808 A.2d 421, 435 (Del. Ch. 2002).
68
Kahn, 638 A.2d at 1117 (citation omitted). See generally In re Emerging
Communications, Inc. S’holders Litig., 2004 WL 1305745 at *31 (Del. Ch. May 3, 2004)
(burden of proof not shifted by approval by special committee and minority stockholders
where company disclosed some projections but failed to disclose more recent
projections).
66
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majority of disinterested stockholders subjects the transaction to review
under the business judgment rule.69
The question arises of how a court will interpret these judicially
crafted provisions in the context of a distressed corporation.70 What
constituency’s approval, if any, would be sufficient to shift the burden to
those challenging the transaction? A combination of constituencies voting
collectively would be problematic. There is not a clear mechanism for
relatively weighting various constituencies, and leaving the weighting to
management creates problems. One can expect constituencies to have
differing desires. Requiring separate votes of and approval by creditors
and stockholders is likely not to result in both constituencies approving (to
say nothing were there separate classes of each). Because management
can play a key role in running a reorganized firm,71 it does not seem
prudent to adopt a principle under which disinterested approval cannot be
obtained and the burden of proving the fairness of the transaction is kept
on managers.
If the constituency to be promoted is left to management to identify,
which would be one extension of the business judgment approach to
understanding Credit Lyonnais duties, management will have much
greater flexibility to defend inefficient self-dealing by carefully selecting a
constituency or combination of constituencies whose interests are
allegedly being promoted. For example, any voluntary sale in which a
class of creditors, the common stockholders or a class of preferred stock
voluntarily participated might be sustainable, the voluntary participation
of one of these classes suggesting, at least in some cases, that the
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In re Wheelabrator Technologies, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, 663 A.2d 1194,
1203-04 (Del. Ch. 1995) (“Even if the ratified transaction does not involve a controlling
stockholder, the result would not be to extinguish a duty of loyalty claim. In such cases
the Supreme Court has held that the effect of shareholder ratification is to make business
judgment the applicable review standard and shift the burden of proof to the plaintiff
stockholder.”).
70
See generally In re Aluminum Mills Corp., 132 B.R. 869, 891 n.21 (Bankr. N.D.
Ill. 1991) (stating shareholder ratification merely estops the shareholders, it “does not
apply in the context of the liquidation of an insolvent company, for in such a case, it is
the creditors who will benefit from a recovery” (quoting In re Western World Funding,
Inc., 52 B.R. 743, 772 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1985)).
71
See, e.g., LaSalle Nat’l Bank v. Perelman, 82 F. Supp. 2d 279, 282, 288 (D. Del.
2000) (controlling stockholder proposing to invest $350 million in recapitalization of the
debtor).
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particular constituents approve, or will approve if required to vote
separately.72
In sum, the contours of fiduciary duties in distressed corporations need
to be formulated to address more than ex post creditor complaints
concerning whether the corporation was well-managed. They also need to
identify the constituency whose approval of an interested-director or
interested-controlling-shareholder transaction can shift the burden of proof
to those challenging the transaction.
A process allowing this kind of approval is needed as part of
implementing a process that prevents conflict-of-interest transactions
produced by improper self-dealing. One supposes whose approval would
be required to shift the burden of proof would need to be the constituency
whose interests the board is to promote at that time. Were the two not the
same, the disinterested approval might frequently be withheld simply
because the potentially approving constituency sought more of the “pie,”
i.e., the disapproval might be for reasons other than that the transaction
improperly represented managerial self-dealing.
If the selection of the constituency to be promoted in that context is
simply delegated to management, that choice is likely to remove from
judicial oversight a material percentage of transactions designed to resolve
financial distress in which management personally participates.73 That
delegation could effectively eviscerate the fairness obligations in conflictof-interest transactions with distressed firms.
Uncertainty in Structuring the Terms of Extraordinary
Transactions—Earn-outs. Under Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes
Holdings, Inc.74 and its progeny, “in a sale of corporate control the
responsibility of the directors is to get the highest value reasonably
attainable for the shareholders.”75 For a number of reasons, a final period
resolution of a distressed corporation is particularly likely to be found
substantively objectionable to at least one constituency. It is wellunderstood among financial economists and legal scholars that leverage
can create incentives for a stylized corporation being managed on behalf
72

See generally In re Emerging Communications, Inc. S’holders Litig., 2004 WL
1305745 at *31 (Del. Ch. May 3, 2004) (“But no Delaware case has held that burdenshifting can be accomplished by a tender of shares rather than by an actual vote.”).
73
See generally supra note 71.
74
506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986)
75
Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1288 (Del. 1988).

SECOND GENERATION ISSUES

28

of its stockholders to invest in negative return activities because the risk of
failure can be disproportionately borne by creditors.76 Famous footnote
fifty-five of Credit Lyonnais77 reflects this principle.
The converse incentive also can exist in a distressed corporation being
managed for the benefit of its creditors. Creditors, who have capped
claims, would not benefit from the incremental value of strategies that
increase a stylized firm’s value over the amount of the creditors’ claims.
Admittedly, this broad statement of principle is somewhat incomplete. A
creditor whose claims are not immediately due may benefit from increased
current value to the debtor. Such a creditor is ultimately concerned about
solvency when its claim becomes due and payable, and increases in
current solvency can make it more likely the debtor will be solvent when
the creditor is to be paid. Nevertheless, just as the fact that the possibility
that adverse outcomes will disproportionately be borne by creditors can
influence the incentives of a firm managed for the benefit of its
stockholders, the possibility that positive outcomes will be
disproportionately benefit stockholders can alter the incentives of a
distressed firm managed for the benefit of creditors.
This concern is not simply theoretical. One basic issue in the
structuring of a sale of a firm is whether the purchase price will include
deferred payments based on the firm’s post-sale performance, sometimes
called “earn-outs.”78 If the distressed firm can negotiate a non-contingent
76

See, e.g., Katherine H. Daigle & Michael T. Maloney, Residual Claims in
Bankruptcy: An Agency Theory Explanation, 37 J.L. & ECON. 157, 157 (1994) (stating
that shareholders’ incentives to engage in excessive risk-taking are “particularly acute”
when the firm is distressed); Laura Lin, Shift of Fiduciary Duty upon Corporate
Insolvency: Proper Scope of Directors’ Duty to Creditors, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1486,
1488-91 (1993); George G. Triantis, A Theory of the Regulation of Debtor-in-Possession
Financing, 46 VAND. L. REV. 901, 912 (1993).
There also is a theoretical argument that an insolvent firm will in fact “underinvest”
in projects, i.e., fail to enter into transactions that would be profitable from the
perspective of the firm as a whole, due to indifference. This theory is based on the notion
that shareholders will not invest new equity (or other efforts) needed to permit
implementation of a new project having a positive return, if the portion of the return to be
realized by shareholders will be in-adequate, because the returns will be given to other
stakeholders, i.e., creditors. See WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS
ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE 258-61 (5th ed. 1993); Triantis, supra, at 911.
77
Civil Action No. 12150, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 215, *108-09 & n.55 (Del. Ch.
Dec. 30, 1991).
78
Maier defines “earn-out” provisions as follows: “Sometimes a portion of the
consideration payable to the shareholders of the target company will be contingent on the
future productivity of the target company or (less commonly) on the productivity of the
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sale price component at least equal to the aggregate amount of the
creditors’ claims, a seller managed for the benefit of the creditors alone
will be indifferent to the amount of any additional contingent
compensation. This conclusion represents a context-specific application
of the more general point, that has been previously made, concerning the
desire of creditors to “collapse [the] probability distribution[]” of potential
outcomes.79 Of course, the shareholders, and a hypothetical constituent
seeking to maximize aggregate firm value, would not be indifferent.
Use of contingent compensation can be important in allowing a seller
to maximize the value it realizes. It can mitigate informational
disadvantages a buyer has that may otherwise yield lower purchase prices.
Adoption of legal principles that shift incentives for using contingent
compensation are therefore of potential concern.
Identifying a Principle for Resolving the Duties. Credit Lyonnais
identifies an issue that, on reflection, cannot be summarily resolved by
simply asserting that when a corporation becomes distressed, directors are
given greater leeway to promote nonshareholder constituencies. Two
possible theoretical concerns have been noted in the context of
extraordinary transactions designed to resolve distress. First, that
approach, delegating to management the authority to decide which
constituency to promote, would eviscerate fairness review as to many
distressed corporations; some class of participating constituents would
consent. Second, creditors and stockholders of distressed firms may have
diametrically opposed views concerning the use of a customary
compensation provision in the sale of a business—an earn-out. Earn-outs
can be beneficial in mitigating the adverse consequences of information
asymmetries between buyers and sellers. Elimination of their use in the
combined group as a whole.” Thomas A. Maier, How Lawyers Use Financial
Information: Mergers, Acquisitions, Valuation and Other Transactions—and Their
Impact on Reported Financial Results, in BASICS OF ACCOUNTING AND FINANCE SUMMER
2005: WHAT EVERY PRACTICING LAWYER NEEDS TO KNOW, at 351, 365 (PLI Corp. Law
& Practice Course Handbook Series No. 6560, 2005).
79
See, e.g., Thomas H. Jackson & Robert E. Scott, On The Nature of Bankruptcy:
An Essay on Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditors’ Bargain, 75 VA. L. REV. 155, 158
(1989).
A circumstance that might be considered analogous is presented in McMullin v.
Beran, 765 A.2d 910 (Del. 2000). In that case, the Delaware Supreme Court held that
minority shareholders had properly pleaded violations of fiduciary duties of directors in
connection with the negotiation and approval of a sale of a majority-owned subsidiary in
connection with, inter alia, improper emphasis on the controlling stockholder’s desire for
immediate receipt of cash. Id. at 921-23.

SECOND GENERATION ISSUES

30

disposition of distressed corporations is therefore likely not to be joint
wealth maximizing. However, promoting consideration of creditors’
interests could require avoiding this structure.
These theoretical concerns are accompanied by post-Credit Lyonnais
authority examining the final period resolution of a distressed corporation.
A few courts have noted a tension between typical board fiduciary duties
on the sale of a firm and the altered fiduciary duties arising on distress or
insolvency.80 One court stated, “It is commonplace to say that the
directors of [the debtor] (due to its balance sheet insolvency) owed a
fiduciary duty to the Noteholders in considering the authorization of the
Merger. It is a more difficult proposition to apply that legal precept to the
facts presented in this case.”81 As recently noted by the court in
Production Resources Group, L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc.,82 the decision in
Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc.83 highlights that the issues
identified in Credit Lyonnais are problematic upon disposition of the firm.
In Omnicare, the court found to be an unlawful abdication of an insolvent
corporation’s directorial authority the entering-into of deal protection
provisions84 for a merger agreement designed “to assure that the . . .
creditors were paid in full and that the . . . stockholders received the
highest value available for their stock.”85 Significantly, the opinion
references the minority stockholders, i.e., not the creditors of the insolvent

80

On the other hand, the court in Wiebolt Stores, Inc. v. Schottenstein, 94 B.R. 488
(N.D. Ill. 1988), rejected the argument of the former directors of an allegedly insolvent
corporation that their Revlon duties sanctioned their approval of an LBO. Id. at 510. The
court held this rationale to be inapplicable because the sale of the firm was not inevitable.
Id. That approach could produce a curious outcome; if the sale became inevitable by
virtue of greater distress, the board then would not have to consider creditors’ interests.
81
Angelo, Gordon & Co. v. Allied Riser Comm. Corp., 805 A.2d 221, 226, 228
(Del. Ch. 2002) (examining a transaction that, in the view of the creditor’s board,
enhanced the likelihood of debt repayment).
82
863 A.2d 772, 788 n.51 (Del. Ch. 2004) (referencing “a decision that arguably
reflects a very different perspective than Credit Lyonnais).
83
818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003).
84
The agreement provided that the board would submit the plan to the
stockholders for their approval even if the board subsequently withdrew its
recommendation of the transaction, id. at 933 (referencing Delaware General Corporation
Law § 251(c) (____)), and omitted a fiduciary-out. Id. at 936. Approval was assured
because stock held by controlling stockholders, who were directors, was also irrevocably
agreed to be voted in favor of the transaction. Id.
85
Id. at 938.
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corporation, in identifying the beneficiaries of fiduciary duties whose
interests had been inadequately protected by the directors.86
Proceeding on the assumption that it is desirable to allow distress to be
resolved outside of bankruptcy proceedings, the need to allow review of
managerial decision-making for purposes of decreasing self-dealing
indicates that it will not be efficient to allow managers to determine at the
time of distress whose interest to promote. The determination needs to be
made ex ante, so that there is a constituency that can bring an action
monitoring management.
Characterizing the rights of potential constituents as options
illuminates the issue. Banks and other creditors who provide capital
frequently will have bargained for certain express rights to participate in
the management of a corporation. Some of the more intrusive powers to
influence management will be actuated when financial distress triggers
covenants allowing acceleration of indebtedness.87 The point of these
rights is to give these creditors the ability to monitor how the business is
being run, and the ability to require that corrective action be taken while
the debtor is still capable of being rescued.
Making creditors the intended88 beneficiaries of fiduciary duties is
different from making stockholders the intended beneficiaries of the
duties. Creditors will have retained the ability to challenge actions the
creditors wish the corporation to undertake. Imposing a separate fiduciary
duty owed to creditors of these distressed firms gives creditors two sets of
rights: either the creditors can intervene, using the expressly negotiated
rights, or the creditors can choose not to intervene, relying on the
possibility that if things do not turn out well, they can bring a claim for
breach of fiduciary duty.
Consider a distressed firm considering two courses of action, A and B.
The distress, triggering covenants, may have given some creditors the
ability to influence the choice. Assume the creditors desire choice A. If
the corporation’s management chooses A, the creditors will not object, the
course will be pursued, and the creditors will have retained some ability to
challenge the propriety of the action as a breach of fiduciary duty. If the
86

Id. at 937.
See supra note 35.
88
Of course, some of these fiduciary duties cannot be directly enforced by
shareholders, but can only be enforced in a derivative capacity. Solely for purposes of
ease of explication, much of the discussion in this paper elides that distinction.
87
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corporation’s management chooses B, the creditors will object and force
the selection of choice A.
That does not mean management would be helpless in this
circumstance. It could seek express approval of any action, as part of
seeking to estop the creditors in any subsequent challenge. This would be
similar to the approval of the fairness of management conflict-of-interest
transactions discussed above,89 but it would be more burdensome because
it would also apply to the wider array of transactions in which
management is disinterested. That process, if frequently invoked, would
deviate from what one normally envisions as the efficient delegation of
decision-making to informed directors (and the officers they appoint).
Balancing Representation to Replicate Aggregate Wealth
Maximization. Part of the customary fiduciary duty scheme seems welldesigned, perhaps inadvertently, to accommodate issues of distressed
corporations. Under Time, part of what is delegated to directors is the
determination of the time horizon considered by directors in managing a
corporation.90 Selection of the time horizon can be particularly important
in allocating value between creditors and equityholders in distressed
corporations.91 There may be a schizophrenic quality to the management
of a distressed corporation as a result. Unless management seeks to
promote the interests of creditors, managerial decision-making may be
subject to being overruled piecewise as to activities implicating
contractual approval requirements.
Yet keeping this issue—the time horizon—within those delegated to
management may give management sufficient flexibility to accommodate
goals of maximizing aggregate wealth within the contours of decisionmaking subject to limited review by creditors having focused
(contractually-negotiated) approval rights. Because creditors will have
express rights to intrude into decision-making that are not accompanied by
a comparable right in stockholders, creditors may have relatively more
ability to influence choices that have an impact on the time horizon being
pursued. It is possible that, where promotion of the interests of the
creditors may not reflect the time horizon in the best interests of all
constituencies collectively, having fiduciary duties owed to stockholders
may be helpful in providing balance in management.
89
90
91

See supra ___.
See supra ___.
See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
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Conclusions. These concerns might be harmonized in the following
conclusions. First, the application of the business judgment rule should, if
anything, be stronger, not weaker, as to claims by creditors in connection
with alleged breaches of duties of care. When creditors have the ability to
influence management decisions but nevertheless allow management to
proceed in a particular way, those creditors should be, if anything, more
limited in their ability to challenge the activity ex post. Any other
outcome creates an option. The option is undesirable because, inter alia, it
will be difficult to price ex ante, suggesting that creditors will not pay for
the option ex ante. It is also problematic because it needlessly enhances
potential personal liability of directors, which is not desirable insofar as
these individuals are risk-averse. Thus, the trend toward applying the
business judgment rule in claims by creditors92 and toward enforcing
against creditors charter provisions limiting director liability to creditors93
is desirable.
92

E.g., Pereira v. Farace, 413 F.3d 330, 342 (2d Cir. 2005) (charter provision
eliminating director liability to the fullest extent permitted by law prevents assertion by
trustee, whether brought on behalf of the corporation or on behalf of the creditors,
seeking monetary damages against directors for breach of duty of care; applying
Delaware law); Angelo, Gordon & Co. v. Allied Riser Comm. Corp., 805 A.2d 221, 229
(Del. Ch. 2002) (“My preliminary view is that, even where the law recognizes that the
duties of directors encompass the interests of creditors, there is room for application of
the business judgment rule.”); Continuing Creditors’ Committee of Star
Telecommunications Inc. v. Edgecomb, Civil Action No. 03-278-KAJ, 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 25807, at *35-38 (Dec. 21, 2004); see Weaver v. Kellogg, 216 B.R. 563, 584
(S.D. Tex. 1997) (implicitly approving application of the business judgment rule in
claims of mismanagement of a distressed corporation); cf. LaSalle Nat’l Bank v.
Perelman, 82 F. Supp. 2d 279, 288, 292 (D. Del. 2000) (discussing actions in
implementing a recapitalization developed one month before a voluntary bankruptcy
petition was filed, where the debtor’s reorganization was not approved by the bankruptcy
court until one and one-half years later); cf. In re RegO Co., 623 A.2d 92 (Del.Ch.,1992)
(“When directors of a dissolved Delaware corporation are, during the course of windingup corporate affairs, required to make decisions affecting various classes of interest
holders, they are protected from liability in doing so, so long as they act disinterestedly,
with due care and in good faith. Devereux v. Berger, 264 Md. 20, 284 A.2d 605 (1971);
In re Xonics Systems, 99 B.R. 870 (Bkrtcy.N.D.Ill.1989).”); see generally Dennis J.
Connolly & Wendy R. Reiss, Second Circuit Says Exculpation Provisions Apply to
Trustee Claims Against Directors, AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE JOURNAL, Sept.
2005, at 26; Growe v. Bedard, No. 03-198-B-S, 2004 WL 2,677,216 (D. Me. Nov. 23,
2004); Steinberg v. Kendig (In re Ben Franklin Retail Stores Inc.), No. 97C7934, 2000
WL 28,266 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 12, 2000).
93
E.g., Production Resources Group, L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772,
798 (Del. Ch. 2004).
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Second, determination of the appropriate time-horizon for measuring
firm strategies should continue to be delegated to management
notwithstanding distress. If the obligation were to follow creditors’
desires, the principle could drive managers to ignore future profits not
inuring to the benefit of creditors having capped claims.
Third, the fiduciary duties to maximize firm value on the sale of a
solvent but distressed firm should continue to be owed to stockholders. In
some distressed firms, creditors will have bargained for express approval
rights. However, neither constituency’s interests will be directly aligned
with the interests of the constituencies as a whole. Requiring that
directors seek to promote the interests of stockholders creates a balance in
which the competing interests can be resolved through negotiation at
which both creditors, having whatever express approval rights they have
negotiated, and equityholders are represented. Creation of a model of
resolution of final-period problems based on bargaining between
competing constituencies is likely superior to requiring directors
simultaneously maximize the returns to constituencies having competing
interests.94 It also creates a single constituency whose interests are to be
promoted, which limits the ability of management to cloak self-dealing by
purporting to represent a non-common stockholder constituency. And it
allows a single constituency to approve a conflict-of-interest transaction,
shifting the burden of proof as to fairness, retaining the ability of some
independent group (the stockholders) to act as a check on managerial selfdealing.
Waiver. A final question is the extent to which these duties should be
waivable.
At the moment, only tentative observations, not firm
conclusions, have been developed. Although at the moment empirical
evidence is not being supplied to support the proposition, one might
hypothesize that it is particularly important to focus on restraining selfdealing when assessing whether these duties can be revised by agreement
(a charter provision or the like). It has been noted by others that one of the
advantages of property rules is that they create uniform sets of rights. The
94

Cf. C-T of Virginia, Inc. v. Barrett (In re C-T of Virginia, Inc.), 958 F.2d 606,
612 (4th Cir. 1992) (stating, in rejecting one party’s argument that consideration received
by stockholders in the firm’s acquisition in a reverse triangular merger constituted a
distribution subject to limits on corporate dividends, that it would impracticable for
directors to fulfill Revlon duties in maximizing sales price in an acquisition structured as
a merger if the directors also had to consider whether the acquiror would remain solvent
following the sale).
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point is that, in some contexts, they allow efficient abstraction—the rights
are the rights, and one need not separately investigate the scope of rights
that are the subject of market transactions. A limited set of rights also
facilitates comparison between possible investments in corporations.
This principle also has been applied to corporation law.95 If we have
“corporations” that have different rules pertaining to how self-dealing in
distress is controlled, there will be additional costs in ascertaining the
operative rules for individual corporations. The expenditure would be
beneficial to make on an individual basis because, as distress approaches,
those with greater knowledge will be more likely to sell their ownership
stakes to those who are less-informed. However, the fact that it would be
beneficial to some to make these expenditures does justify creating a legal
scheme that makes the expenditures desirable on an individual basis. In
the aggregate, the expenditures represent the costs to assemble information
that is only valuable by virtue of the pertinent legal rule. No one would
have to make the expenditures if legal rules did not allow for multiple
possible relationships. At the moment, no empirical evidence is being
presented that the value from allowing, for example, corporations to elect
to have the burden of proof of fairness of conflict-of-interest transactions
shift on distress to approval by creditors. All that can be said is that it is
not clear that the aggregate value of allowing this would exceed the
aggregate cost arising from investigating whether particular corporations
had adopted such provisions.96
3. Fairness of Terms Negotiated with Creditors; Disclosure
Obligations.
Consideration of Credit Lyonnais raises the issue of how any duties
owed to non-shareholder constituencies will influence a distressed
corporation’s dealings with its creditors. Typically, of course, a
corporation’s contracting with trade creditors is the product of ordinary
95

Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational
Law, 110 YALE L.J. 387 (2000).
96
There are also distributional concerns. Less-informed investors would be less
likely to investigate, and would therefore be more likely to be disadvantaged. The costs
of allowing waiver would need to include precaution costs expended by less-informed
investors, e.g., in the hiring of investment advisors, any consequences of disproportionate
bearing of these costs on persons particularly more risk-averse than others and the
possibility that those with access to the information would use it as part of implicit
commercial bribery to influence other corporate decisionmaking (e.g., an investment firm
providing the information in advance to “favored” customers who may steer future
business, in the same way that initial public offerings have been allocated in the past).
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market transactions in which the corporation is not required to defer to the
interests of the creditors. The traditional rule as to employment
relationships is the same—in negotiating the terms of an employee’s
compensation, the parties are not fiduciaries of each other.97
Somewhat anomalous in this regard is the application of federal insider
trading prohibitions on the sale of shares, which in market transactions
could easily be to persons who are not already shareholders.98
Nevertheless, insider trading prohibitions apply to a fiduciary’s sales of
shares on the basis of material nonpublic information.99 Thus, a full
extension upon distress or insolvency of the fiduciary duties owed to
stockholders could appertain to each extension of credit in distress or in
insolvency. Of course, federal insider trading principles would not apply
to most extensions of credit, as they would not involve the sale of a
security.100 But, on a similar theory, a court applying general state antifraud provisions, i.e., fraud provisions not limited to the purchase or sale
of a security, could find fiduciary obligations applying in a transaction
creating the fiduciary relationship.
Of course, a determination that fiduciary obligations did not apply to a
transaction creating a fiduciary relationship would not dispose of the issue
of the nature of fiduciary obligations owed creditors of distressed
corporations. In the course of normal operations, distressed corporations
will contract with existing creditors, and the issue of the scope of fiduciary
duties appertaining to that contracting requires resolution. Two types of
duties are discussed below: First, a court could seek to reform the process
by which these contracts are negotiated by imposing disclosure obligations
that would not appertain in market transactions between independent
parties. Second, a court could impose a fairness obligation.
Disclosure. Particularly thorny consequences of classifying creditors
as beneficiaries of fiduciary duties of distressed corporations are raised by
disclosure obligations of fiduciaries. There are two possible theories
giving rise to altered disclosure obligations. In some contexts, when a
fiduciary contract with the beneficiaries of the duties, the fiduciary
operates under heightened disclosure obligations, even as to transactions
97

__________.
See generally Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227 n.8 (1980) (citing
authority that references Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46, 49 (2d Cir. 1951)—authority
construing the not patently analogous section 16, 15 U.S.C. § __ ).
99
Id.
100
See 15 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(__) (200_).
98
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that are not modifications of relationships that gave rise to the fiduciary
obligation.101 Transactions between a corporation and its stockholders
alleging breach of fiduciary duty typically, however, involve transactions
in the securities,102 which raises substantial questions concerning whether
other transactions, e.g., transactions not involving the instrument creating
the beneficiary relationship, would trigger disclosure obligations.
However, Malone v. Brincat103 suggests another basis for duties
concerning disclosure. In that case, the Delaware Supreme Court stated:
When the directors are not seeking shareholder action, but are
deliberately misinforming shareholders about the business of the
corporation, either directly or by a public statement, there is a
violation of fiduciary duty. That violation may result in a
derivative claim on behalf of the corporation or a cause of action
for damages. There may also be a basis for equitable relief to
remedy the violation.104
The Brincat opinion at times seems to peg the duty to the fact that the
stockholders elected the directors.105 At other points, however, the
opinion indicates these duties “derive[] from the combination of the
fiduciary duties of care, loyalty and good faith.”106
Conceptualizing creditors as beneficiaries of fiduciary obligations can
significantly affect how a distressed corporation is required to be run.
Consider, for example, subsequent purchases of goods or services on trade
credit. Imposing a fiduciary duty of candor to creditors would require
greater disclosure of the corporation’s financial position.
The impact would not be limited to trade creditors. A typical strategy
to recapitalize a distressed firm involves repurchasing the corporation’s

101

_______.
See, e.g., Birbeck v. American Toll Bridge Co. of California, 2 A.2d 158, 165
(Del. Ch. 1938) (stockholders exchanged their stock for stock in a second, newly-formed
corporation in a transaction organized by officers of the corporation; the court ordered
cancelation, as a “secret” profit, of stock acquired by those officers in the successor
corporation disproportionate to their interests in the initial corporation).
103
722 A.2d 5 (Del. 1998).
104
722 A.2d at 14 (footnote omitted).
105
Id. at 10-11 (“Shareholders are entitled to rely upon the truthfulness of all
information disseminated to them by the directors they elect to manage the corporate
enterprise.”).
106
Id. at 11.
102
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outstanding debt at reduced prices, perhaps as part of an exchange offer.107
In the face of sparse authority, there has been some disagreement in the
literature concerning whether traditional norms, i.e., principles not arising
from Credit Lyonnais, impose disclosure obligations on the corporation.108
A disclosure obligation could materially influence the outcome of
attempted debt repurchases not accompanied by a simultaneous exchange
offer (a simultaneous exchange offer, on the other hand, could impose
candor obligations109).
Debt repurchases may be a single component of a multi-part plan of
recapitalization. For example, additional equity may be contemplated.
Plans for subsequent equity infusions could well be material to
bondholders deciding whether to accept a repurchase offer. Application of
fiduciary duties would clarify the pertinent legal landscape, affecting the
efficacy of debt repurchases in resolving distress.
Whether a corporation should be able to repurchase its debt without
disclosing other material plans is a complex subject, whose analysis is
beyond the scope of this paper. The point being made here is more
limited: Treating creditors as the beneficiaries of a corporation’s fiduciary
duties will, as to distressed corporations, influence this currently open
issue of law. The decision is consequential in this context.
Moreover, because a corporation’s operations typically involve greater
ongoing communication between the firm and its creditors than between
the firm and its stockholders—communication that is much more
107

See, e.g., Allen L. Weingarten, Consensual Non-Bankruptcy Restructuring of
Public Debt Securities, 23 SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 159, 161 (Sept. 19, 1990).
108
Insert, e.g., In re Worlds of Wonder Securities Litigation, 1990 WL 260,675 (N.
D. Cal. Oct 19, 1990) (discussing insider trading claim asserted by holders of convertible
bonds); DONALD C. LANGEVOORT INSIDER TRADING REGULATION, ENFORCEMENT, AND
PREVENTION § 3:12 (Database updated June 2005) (“The approach more consistent with
Chiarella is that no abstain or disclose obligation arises in connection with trading in debt
securities, leaving liability in such a case to rest on the misappropriation theory . . . .”);
Richard Hall, Recent Developments in Duties of Disclosure and Candor, in CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE INSTITUTE: BLUEPRINT FOR GOOD GOVERNANCE IN THE 1990S, at 719, 727
(PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 1053, 1998) (“It is not clear
whether the requirement that an issuer not be trading in its own securities applies to
repurchases of debt securities or equity securities other than common stock. As the
analytic basis for the disclosure requirement under Rule 10b-5 is the fiduciary duty owed
to certain securityholders, the better view seems to be that repurchases of debt securities
and preferred stock (at least non-convertible preferred stock) should not give rise to any
disclosure requirement.”).
109
See Weingarten, supra note 107, at 163-65.
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voluminous—the disclosure obligation under Brincat could be implicated
in numerous communications with creditors.
The required
communications could accelerate exercise of creditors’ remedies and limit
the corporation’s options in resolving distress.
Fair Terms. Fiduciary duties in some contexts require that any
contract between the fiduciary and the beneficiary of the duty be on fair
terms. The precise contours of such a duty to stockholders are,
unfortunately, not entirely clear. For example, Loewenstein and Wang
have recently noted:
On the more general question as to whether the
corporation owes fiduciary duties to an individual
stockholder, the decided cases are surprisingly mixed.
Some courts hold, as a general proposition, that a
corporation does owe a fiduciary duty to an individual
shareholder, while others conclude the opposite. Possibly,
in some jurisdictions, a company otherwise has no
fiduciary duty to an individual stockholder, but does breach
a fiduciary duty to a shareholder from whom it purchases
stock without disclosing material, nonpublic information.
Obviously, from a doctrinal viewpoint, this is troubling.
So, from the initial question noted above, one is led quickly
to the general question of the corporate fiduciary duty to an
individual stockholder and its implications.110
Transactions in the securities themselves, i.e., repurchases, to which
Cox, Hazen and O’Neal indicate “[d]isclosure obligations clearly
attach,”111 are perhaps most likely to give rise to fairness obligations as
well.112
However, because the contours of the actual duties to
stockholders are different from other fiduciary duties113 and are also not
110

Mark J. Loewenstein & William K.S. Wang, The Corporation as Insider Trader,
30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 45, 48-49 (2005) (footnotes omitted).
111
JAMES D. COX ET AL., CORPORATIONS § 21.8, at __ n.13 (____).
112
One potentially relevant case is Birbeck v. American Toll Bridge Co. of
California, 2 A.2d 158 (Del. Ch. 1938), a case involving stockholders who exchanged
their stock for stock in a second, newly-formed corporation in a transaction organized by
officers of the corporation. The court ordered cancelation, as a “secret” profit, of stock
acquired by those officers in the successor corporation disproportionate to their interests
in the initial corporation. Id. at 165.
113
An interesting adverse relationship between a controlling stockholder and the
corporation was at issue in Odyssey Partners, L.P. v. Fleming Cos., 735 A.2d 386, 388,
406 & n.18 (Del. Ch. 1999). The court indicated that a controlling stockholders’
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fully formulated, it is difficult to assess the extent to which these
incompletely formulated fiduciary duties would be revised upon
distress.114
A final wrinkle involves principles governing close corporations.
Some jurisdictions, notably including Massachusetts115 and excluding
Delaware,116 have in the past sought to impose on stockholders of closely
held corporations the norms of conduct typically applied to partners in a
partnership.117 Creative counsel might seek to assert in a jurisdiction
following this norm that, where a distressed corporation has a relatively
small number of creditors, the creditors benefit from fiduciary duties akin
to those in partnerships.
Principles Underlying a Potential Approach. One may hypothesize
that it is relatively unusual for a sophisticated business entity, in the course
of negotiations, to seek expressly the right to lie to the other party. That
does not mean parties do not lie. Nor does it mean that they do not, in
negotiations, recast their desire to avoid liability for false or misleading
statements in more palatable terms. A seller of a business might, for
example, assert that it is providing all information that it knows but wants
to avoid the transaction costs of post-sale squabbles.
A typical formulation of fraud liability, based on one provided by
Prosser and Keeton, is as follows: (i) a false representation, ordinarily of
fact; (ii) the defendant’s knowledge the statement is false or that he does
not have a sufficient basis to make the representation; (iii) an intention to
induce the plaintiff to act, or to refrain from acting, in reliance; (iv)
justifiable reliance by the plaintiff; and (v) damage.118
acquisition of the assignment of a commercial loan made to the corporation is not subject
to fiduciary constraints.
114
One potentially analogous case is PPI Enterprises (U.S.), Inc. v. Del Monte
Foods Co., 2000 WL 1,425,093, at *__ (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2000). In that case, the court
stated that no fiduciary duty owed was owed by corporation directly to holders of
preferred stock who were selling the stock. The court consequently dismissed an aiding
and abetting claim against investment bank.
115
See generally Lewenberg v. Del Regno, No. CA-1999-5681-C, 2001 WL
1,517,571, at *2-3 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 24, 2001) (examining partnership-like duties in
closely held corporation in connection with a stockholder’s terminating employment and
disclosure obligations concerning an associated stock repurchase).
116
____________.
117
____________.
118
This statement is a highly edited version of the elements stated in W. PAGE
KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 105, at 728 (W. Page
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Consider the nature of the relationship between a distressed corporate
debtor and financial creditors (e.g., banks). A debtor might seek to make
misleading statements that would influence the creditor in deciding
whether to exercise remedies available by virtue of covenant defaults—
cause an omission.119 In this way, the relationship between the distressed
debtor and its trade creditors may be qualitatively different. The
distressed debtor may be engaged in ongoing transactions with its trade
creditors, and the pending transaction that may be influenced by a
misstatement (e.g., the purchase of inventory or raw materials on trade
credit) may be patent. One potentially desirable component of an
affirmative fiduciary duty to creditors of distressed corporations, then,
could be the imposition of a duty, paralleling that formulated in Brincat,
requiring communications between creditors and distressed debtors be
accurate, regardless of whether a transaction was pending.
This proposed principle of corporation law is designed to address
management of a corporation, not the general principles of rights creditors
have against debtors.120 The proposed principle is that misstatements
designed to influence whether a creditor exercises contractually acquired
rights to control a now-distressed debtor should be actionable without
Keeton, general ed., 5th ed. 1984); nothing original to this author is stated, but the editing
of the original is sufficiently extensive that the marks indicating alteration would
materially inhibit legibility. The original states in full:
1. A false representation made by the defendant. In the ordinary case, this
representation must be one of fact.
2. Knowledge or belief on the part of the defendant that the representation
is false—or, what is regarded as equivalent, that he has not a sufficient basis of
information to make it. This element is often given the technical name of
“scienter.”
3. An intention to induce the plaintiff to act or to refrain from action in
reliance upon the misrepresentation.
4. Justifiable reliance upon the representation on the part of the plaintiff, in
taking action or refraining from it.
5. Damage to the plaintiff, resulting from such reliance.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
119
The Brincat opinion in fact expressly notes that the plaintiffs allegedly did not
sell and therefore did not have a claim under federal securities law. 722 A.2d at 13.
120
But cf. ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 91-92 (1986) (identifying as
principles that should collectively produce a coherent body of law principles of veil
piercing, fraudulent conveyance and equitable subordination). See generally C-T of
Virginia, Inc. v. Barrett (In re C-T of Virginia, Inc.), 958 F.2d 606, 613 (4th Cir. 1992)
(noting the availability of fraudulent conveyance statutes as a means of addressing
creditors’ grievances in discussing why corporation law restrictions on dividends did not
restrict payment of consideration in a reverse triangular merger).
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proof that the debtor anticipated reliance. It is not designed to address
general principles of debtor / creditor law and statements made to
influence normal creditors’ rights (e.g., repossession of collateral and
initiation of legal proceedings to collect on matured and unpaid
obligations).
An affirmatively enforceable fiduciary duty in favor of creditors of
distressed corporations is being proposed here. That raises the question
whether it can simultaneously co-exist with a similar fiduciary duty for the
benefit of the stockholders. It is submitted that these two fiduciary duties
can properly co-exist, and that creating this fiduciary duty does not,
therefore, put directors in the untenable position of having necessarily
conflicting duties to two constituencies having different interests. In brief,
the reason is that a duty to be candid with one constituency does not
impose a concomitant obligation not to be candid with other
constituencies.
Within the range of lawful conduct, fiduciaries have some discretion in
setting the level of candor that they bring to negotiations. Some sets of
fiduciaries would be entitled to expect that, in negotiations, they would be
given discretion to decide the extent they disseminate information to
counterparties. For example, a client has no right to expect a lawyer to
provide an opposing party false or misleading information merely because
no reliance on that misstatement is anticipated.
It may be that imposing duties of candor applicable to both
equityholders and creditors would produce results that, in the immediate
term, are worse for equityholders than not imposing these obligations. In
that way, one might view these additional duties as inconsistent with the
obligation owed to common stockholders. But if one views beneficiaries
of fiduciary duties as not necessarily entitled to demand lack of candor
with third parties, there would appear to be more of a basis for imposing
on those managing a distressed corporation a duty to speak accurately
when speaking. To put it another way, Brincat imposes an affirmative
duty of candor in some contexts. But this is an asymmetric duty; it does
not impose an obligation to avoid candor with others.
VI. COMPETITION AND CORPORATE OPPORTUNITIES
Formality in Decision-making. Weaver v. Kellogg121 illuminates the
interaction of fiduciary duties owed to other constituencies with the
121

216 B.R. 563, 580-84 (S.D. Tex. 1997).
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corporate opportunity doctrine. These concerns are not trivial, particularly
in the case of smaller corporations.
Although the language of the opinion is not entirely clear on this point,
Broz appears to indicate that a financial inability of a corporation to take
advantage of what otherwise would be a corporate opportunity exculpates
the fiduciary who takes advantage of the opportunity.122 Although the
Broz opinion is not express on the point, this interpretation of Broz implies
that the Credit Lyonnais duties do not extend to corporate opportunities.
The language in Broz concerning there being no obligation to offer an
opportunity to those anticipated to be stockholders in the future123 is not
inconsistent.
The A.L.I. principles, on the other hand, do not have this broad
exculpation.124 Following the A.L.I. approach in this circumstance creates
difficulties if the Credit Lyonnais duties are to extend to corporate
opportunities. The problem is that insiders are likely to inadvertently
violate the pertinent requirements. The insider seeking to take advantage
of the opportunity would not necessarily have any reason to know of the
interests of creditors of the distressed corporation. Multiple creditors
might be interested in a particular opportunity, presenting questions of
which creditor should be offered the opportunity. There is not a simple
mechanism in place that would allow the creditors to vote—determining
the number of votes for each creditor, for example.
Lastly, in the case of smaller distressed corporations, one can expect a
significant amount of informality in the way in which corporate
opportunities are relinquished. In the course of trying to say afloat,
resources may be diverted away from what may appear unimportant
matters of legal housekeeping. If the informality can be subsequently
challenged by a trustee, or the creditors bringing a direct action, the law
will have created a potentially significant adverse consequence that can be
inadvertently created.
122

Broz v. Cellular Information Systems, Inc., 673 A.2d 148 (Del. 1996).
Id. at __.
124
American Law Institute, Principles of Corporate Governance § 5.05, reporter’s
n.8 (1994) (“Section 5.05 contemplates that whenever an opportunity, as defined in §
5.05(b), is present, it is to be offered to the corporation, which may then determine
whether the obstacles to accepting the opportunity are insuperable or can be avoided. . . .
If the opportunity is never offered to the corporation, the director or senior executive who
takes the opportunity may not thereafter defend on the ground that there was no
opportunity because the corporation was unable to accept it.”).
123
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Weaver v. Kellogg125 illustrates the problems. In that case, the court
denied a motion for summary judgment on claims alleging breach of the
corporate opportunity doctrine. The corporation, which had only two
shareholders (who, at the pertinent times, also were the sole directors),
loaned the shareholders money, which allegedly was used to purchase
other businesses.126 Notwithstanding the defendants’ argument that the
transactions were implicitly approved or ratified,127 the court stated, inter
alia, “Defendants would not, in any case, have had the right to waive the
rights of [the corporation’s] creditors.”128 The court ultimately concluded,
“The Court holds that Plaintiff may therefore prevail on his breach of
corporate duty claims if he shows, for each allegedly wrongful transaction,
that [the corporate debtor] was, at the time, in ‘the vicinity of
insolvency[;]’ that the transaction led to [the corporate debtor’s]
insolvency; or that the transaction was a fraudulent conveyance, as defined
by the federal and state statutes . . . .”129
A concern with inadvertent failure to waive properly a corporate
opportunity is offset by concern that a corporate opportunity or other
breach of a duty may be waived in undesirable circumstances. Distress
may cause stockholders, or those acting on their behalf, to be indifferent,
which can result in waiver of fiduciary obligations not in the best interests
of all constituencies (the return to the corporation of taking the
opportunity may in some future states benefit only the creditors.) One
might seek to treat differently (i) direct competition with the distressed
corporation and (ii) opportunities coming to the insiders’ attention solely
by reason of his office with the corporation. Tests of corporate
opportunities typically reference opportunities that in fairness belong to
the corporation. That does not really provide an actual test. A better
principle in the context of distress is as follows: If the corporation is
insolvent, the creditors, with capped claims, would benefit. However,
their failure to have exercised creditors’ remedies suggests creditors
should not be able to challenge the activity ex post. If the corporation is
distressed by solvent, creditors are particularly particularly disadvantaged
only by actions that decrease corporate value, not merely as much as acts
that prevent the corporation from further increasing its solvency. One
may therefore seek to distinguish between competition with the distressed
125
126
127
128
129

216 B.R. 563 (S.D. Tex. 1997).
Id. at 579-81.
Id. at 581.
Id. at 582.
Id. at 584 (citation omitted) (quoting Credit Lyonnais).
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corporation, and opportunities in other geographic areas or in lines of
business only related to the distressed corporation’s business. On this
basis, one might find as actionable by, or on behalf of, the creditors
officers or directors improperly competing with the corporation or
improper, premature actions in preparing to compete. An illustration is
provided by Roth v. Mims, in which during distress the president made
arrangements for sale of the distressed corporation’s assets and
employment with a firm that would operate the assets.130
VII. CONCLUSIONS
This paper demonstrates that existence of an affirmatively enforceable
duty under the principles of Credit Lyonnais is not moot. The existence of
aiding and abetting liability for breach of fiduciary duty will give rise to a
greater set of potentially liable defendants and will increase the remedies
otherwise available were the duties contemplated by Credit Lyonnais not
affirmatively enforceable (aiding and abetting a fraudulent transfer
typically not separately giving rise to liability).
Moreover, the issues raised by Credit Lyonnais highlight a basic
problem that has not yet been definitively addressed:
which
constituency’s approval of a distressed corporation’s conflict-of-interest
transactions will result in the application of the business judgment rule.
This paper argues that during distress short of bankruptcy proceedings,
fiduciary duties to maximize firm value on a sale should continue to be
owed to stockholders. Approval of conflict-of-interest transactions by
disinterested stockholders should continue to shift the burden of proof as
to the fairness of the transaction.
This paper also argues that the obligation of candor under Malone v.
Brincat should appertain to communications with creditors, thereby
creating a duty not to make affirmative misstatements, regardless of
whether the communication is in connection with approval of a particular
action by the creditors. Financial creditors will consider the information
provided in connection with deciding whether to exercise contractually
negotiated control rights, and creditors should be entitled to rely on
truthfulness even if the debtor is not aware of a particular action the
creditor may take in reliance.
The fact that parties do not expressly bargain for these rights does not
mean that providing them would be inefficient. The nature of the subject
130
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matter—one’s ability to lie—makes it difficult to address in contract
formation. Parties may not raise the issue in negotiations because doing
so inhibits the trust necessary to enter into voluntary contractual
relationships. If it were not difficult to raise this issue, it would be the
subject of express bargaining, and at least some of the parties would not
avoid using the colloquial term “lie” where the typical formulations do not
invariably limit liability. Nevertheless, a search of the 866 asset purchase
agreements in the CORI contract database identified no contract in which
the parties included language addressing “lies.”
Lastly, this paper argues in favor of the developing trend extending
application of the business judgment rule to alleged violations of duties of
care during distress by or on behalf of creditors, and to applying charter
exculpation provisions to eliminate that liability. In reaching this
conclusion, this paper examines the extent to which an alternative
conclusion creates options in creditors that are difficult to value and are
therefore problematic.

